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A LEGAL MAP OF NEW LOCAL PARKLAND
DANIEL B. ROSENBAUM*
Public parks play consequential roles in local communities. Parks can
raise property values, encourage or inhibit sprawl, and promote health, safety,
and social cohesion. The decision to create a park affects development in the
surrounding area and dictates which residents can easily access the property’s
new amenities—and which residents cannot.
Yet, public stakeholders are given few signposts in making and monitoring
public park acquisitions. Data on new parkland is scarce; moreover, the legal
framework undergirding the process is poorly understood and rarely explored,
particularly at the local government level. Although local governments are
America’s leading stewards and gatekeepers of public park property, the
actions of a parks department when acquiring new land receive bare direction
from the formal legal regime and little attention from legal scholars. Instead,
state law and judicial precedent grants almost unconstrained local discretion
when acquiring parkland, a framework that delegates lawmaking to the lowest
level of governance: to the local and sublocal institutions whose internal
policies and unwritten practices determine what parkland is acquired, how
potential land acquisitions are reviewed, and which stakeholders and priorities
carry most weight in the process. Viewed as a whole, these policies and
practices constitute an informal, heterogeneous legal regime of local parkland
acquisition.
This Article sheds light on this informal legal regime. It first aims to
identify where parkland is actually being acquired, employing an empirical
review of property recently obtained for park purposes at many of the largest
local departments and authorities across the United States. The Article then
analyzes this data against the policies and practices that drove each
acquisition. In doing so, it builds a framework for understanding sublocal
acquisition regimes and for arbitrating between oft-competing values of equity
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law (until May 2022).
Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law (from August 2022). This Article
benefitted from its presentation at the Association of Law, Property, and Society (ALPS). The author
owes a debt of gratitude to Kwin Keuter, Dr. Carrie Beth Lasley, and Harlan McCaffery for applying
their expertise in statistics and geographic information systems to the weeds of local park property
data, and to Wendy Xu for providing excellent research assistance and aiding the tall task of compiling
internal park acquisition policies. This Article would not have been possible without each of their
efforts.
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and efficiency—while at the same time assessing the normative impact of
institutional informality, both in the parkland context and for local governance
more broadly. The Article concludes by recommending that state legislatures
play a stronger role in guiding sublocal actors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every parcel of parkland has an origin story. A park property—one
dedicated to greenspace or recreation and open to public use1—might have been
donated generations in the past or purchased only yesterday. Some parks are
created on reclaimed industrial land whereas others are carved out of pristine
wildlife habitats. In practice, the path a property takes to becoming public
greenspace can witness a number of twists and turns; its genesis could be years
or decades in the making. How and whether a property reaches that finish line
is a factor of its legal environment. The law of parkland creation is
consequential—for communities located near parks, for those not located near
parks, and for the governance institutions that administer the process—yet the
regime is unrecognized and underexplored, a blind spot that enables under-theradar, heterogeneous decision-making without thought as to how those
decisions translate into meaningful sites of policy and law over time.
Two origin stories are illustrative. In Johnson County, Kansas, an
undeveloped property—labeled Parcel 3010 in tax records—sits near the
confluence of Mill Creek and Clear Creek, an area of gently sloping woods and

1. See infra note 26 (defining “park property” for purposes of this Article).
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fields towards the western outskirts of the Kansas City metropolitan region.2
Until 2014, the property was privately held, sandwiched between two other
parcels owned by the Johnson County Park and Recreation District.3 People
running or cycling on the Clear Creek Trail may not have realized the invisible
boundaries that sliced through their surroundings, but private ownership of
Parcel 3010 nevertheless limited the Park and Recreation District’s
management of its adjacent land.4 For this reason, when the parcel’s owner
approached the District with an interest in selling, the District’s staff sprang
into action. They assessed the site, ensured adequate funding, and moved
forward with a fee simple acquisition of the parcel, closing on the transaction
in 2015.5
Another acquisition story comes from Jacksonville, Florida, where a bright
yellow house at 2095 Forest Street in the city’s Mixon Town neighborhood—a
historically Black residential community challenged by years of divestment and
population turnover6—went vacant during the Great Recession. The property
subsequently fell into disrepair and then tax foreclosure.7 In 2019, it was
acquired by the City of Jacksonville for $100, which placed the parcel under
the management of the Parks, Recreation, and Community Services
Department.8 To the casual observer, the house at 2095 Forest Street bears no
resemblance to Parcel 3010 in Johnson County. It is not adjacent to publiclyowned park properties. Nor does it contain the common trappings of local

2. See Johnson County Department of Technology & Innovation, AUTOMATED INFORMATION
MAPPING SYSTEM https://maps.jocogov.org/ims/ [https://perma.cc/QK8F-UKHF] (search for “Parcel
0460411203002003010”).
3. Telephone Interview with Bill Maasen, Superintendent of Parks and Golf Courses, Johnson
County Park and Recreation District (Dec. 15, 2020) (notes on file with author).
4. Id. The District held an easement across the parcel, but this easement did not provide the
District with the full powers of fee simple ownership. See infra note 37 and accompanying text
(discussing the value of fee simple estates in park property). It also came with maintenance obligations
for a privately-owned bridge and impeded the District’s ability to conduct flood mitigation activities
around the site.
5. Id. See also Johnson County Park and Recreation District, Properties Acquired Since 2010
(Dec. 9, 2020) (on file with author).
6. Ennis Davis, The Story of Jacksonville’s West Lewisville, THE JAXSON MAG. (June 7, 2018),
https://www.thejaxsonmag.com/article/the-story-of-jacksonvilles-west-lewisville/
[https://perma.cc/A9T2-U6DX].
7. See
Search
for
“2095
Forest,
Jacksonville,
Florida,”
GOOGLE MAPS
https://goo.gl/maps/67c55U9NH499yZ5W7 [https://perma.cc/KXX4-99L4]; Response to Public
Records Request from City of Jacksonville to Wendy Xu, Univ. of Detroit Mercy Sch. of L. (Mar. 29,
2021) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jacksonville Public Records Request].
8. City
of
Jacksonville
JaxGIS,
DUVAL
MAPS
PROP.
APPLICATION
https://maps.coj.net/duvalproperty/ [https://perma.cc/M45X-WTAM] (search for “2095 Forest”);
Jacksonville Public Records Request, supra note 7.
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parkland; there are no recreational facilities, woods, or streams located on or
near 2095 Forest. Rather, the parcel sits unremarkably on a quiet residential
street, several blocks from the nearest public greenspace and adjacent only to
private residential homes.9
In this manner, however, the sharp contrasts between Parcel 3010 and 2095
Forest underscore basic shared commonalities: both parcels were voluntarily
acquired and purposefully placed under the control of local park entities, and
both acquisitions, presumably, were made with policy reasons in mind. In
Johnson County, local officials were motivated to consolidate ownership and
control over once-private inholdings within an existing park system. In
Jacksonville, meanwhile, officials may have been driven by an almost opposite
goal, not to expand an existing park at the urban fringe but to create a new one
within the urban core, in the process replacing a vacant home with greenspace
for an economically-marginalized community.10 These goals and acquisitions
do not arise in a vacuum. Local government agencies operate with finite
acquisition dollars, staff time, maintenance resources, and political capital.11 In
acquiring Parcel 3010, Johnson County’s Park and Recreation District made a
policy decision to place its resources and energies into a neighborhood that
already boasted expansive greenspace.12 By acquiring 2095 Forest, in contrast,
the City of Jacksonville prioritized a property in a neighborhood lacking such
greenspace, perhaps at the expense of opportunities to acquire more pristine
conservation properties and expand upon parkland elsewhere.
Such tradeoffs are inherent to local park acquisition. When assessing
properties owned by a local park agency—whether a department of the general
purpose government, as in Jacksonville, or a special purpose government, as in

9. See id. The nearest publicly-owned park appears to be McCoy’s Creek Boulevard Park,
removed by several blocks and an interstate highway from 2095 Forest.
10. See infra notes 15–18 (discussing the competing policy tradeoffs that inform acquisition
decisions).
11. See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text (discussing fiscal constraints placed upon
park acquisition). See also Telephone Interview with Glenn Boorman, Deputy Div. Dir. of Project
Admin., Gwinnett Cnty. Parks and Recreation (Apr. 20, 2021) (notes on file with author) (discussing
fiscal tradeoffs); Keith W. Rizzardi, Money, Mandates, and Water Management: Foreshadowing A
Florida Disaster, 21 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 36 (2019) (exploring the impact of fiscal constraints on local
governance institutions).
12. Parcel 3010 is located in Mill Creek Streamway Park, which contains seventeen miles of
trails that extend into the nearby Shawnee Mission Park, a large 1,655-acre recreational and nature
facility.
See Mill Creek Streamway, JOHNSON CNTY. PARKS AND RECREATION DIST.,
https://www.jcprd.com/Facilities/Facility/Details/Mill-Creek-Streamway-Park-40
[https://perma.cc/V6E4-E6K6]; Shawnee Mission Park, JOHNSON CNTY. PARKS AND RECREATION
DIST.,
https://www.jcprd.com/facilities/facility/details/Shawnee-Mission-Park-14
[https://perma.cc/K2TD-FEDU].
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Johnson County13—some of this inventory may appear the product of historical
accident; for example, the agency might have acquired several parks in a onetime transfer from the state or via a series of significant donations that occurred
decades in the past.14 But modern parkland acquisition is not based on
happenstance. Rather, policy and law guide local priorities, informing an
agency’s decision whether or not to acquire a given parcel of land.15 Some local
agencies prioritize efficiencies in the acquisition process and acquire properties
that can be obtained expediently or cheaply.16 Others prioritize substantive
geographic goals along the lines discussed above in Johnson County and
Jacksonville: as a matter of formal or informal policy, one local agency may
prefer to acquire property adjacent to existing parkland while another might
seek opportunities in areas with no existing greenspace.17 One agency might

13. This Article uses the term “park agency” to characterize both of these organizational forms.
For purposes of this Article, a park agency is a local entity, authority, or department that manages local
parkland within a given jurisdiction, whether created as a special purpose government or acting as a
subsidiary of a general-purpose municipality, county, or regional authority. See infra Part III(A)
(discussing the Article’s aim of selecting representative institutional forms that directly govern local
park property).
14. See Paul Stanton Kibel, The People Down the Hill: Parks Equity in San Francisco’s East
Bay, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 331 (2007). This article appears to offer the only direct account
of local parkland acquisition policies in the legal scholarship. It surveys the history of the East Bay
Regional Park District, a special purpose governmental authority in California, and argues that its land
acquisitions over time have yielded an inequitable allocation of parkland between the region’s
wealthier foothills, where park property is more abundant, and its lower-income coastal plain, where
parkland is scarcer. See id. at 332. While demonstrating how policy decisions have informed recent
park acquisition decisions, the article also illustrates the historical accidents that created East Bay’s
modern inventory, including property being transferred from another governmental entity that held
significant inventory in hillside areas before the region was built out. Id. at 352–55.
15. See id. at 355–59. Park staffers interviewed for this article noted a shift towards policydriven decision-making over time. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Paul Sun, Land Acquisition
Specialist, Prince George’s Cnty. Dept. of Parks and Recreation (Mar. 24, 2021) (notes on file with
author). In part, this is a product of supply: just as governmental entities are resource-constrained, so
too is the inventory of undeveloped land in metropolitan regions, a product of urban growth and sprawl
since World War II. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Glenn Boorman, supra note 11 (discussing
growth and decreased land availability). See also infra Part II (defining the legal regime of parkland
acquisition).
16. See, e.g., E-mail from Tom Korosei, Land Manager, Mun. of Anchorage Parks and
Recreation Dep’t (May 14, 2021) (on file with author) (discussing the role of funding availability and
noting that most acquisitions occur via donation); Telephone Interview with Kelly Grissman, Dir. of
Plan., Three Rivers Park Dist. (May 21, 2021) (notes on file with author) (discussing tradeoffs between
process and expediency).
17. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Allen Ishibashi, Senior Real Prop. Agent, Midpeninsula
Reg’l Open Space Dist. (Feb. 25, 2021) (notes on file with author) (prioritizing adjacent property
acquisition); Telephone Interview with Clement Lau, Dept’l Facilities Planner, Cnty. of L.A. Dept. of
Parks and Recreation (Feb. 2, 2021) (notes on file with author) (prioritizing access and equity).
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aim to conserve unimproved natural areas whereas another works to repurpose
brownfield sites.18
These priorities—whether official or unofficial, stated or unstated—impact
not only the property actually acquired by a local park agency, but also the
relationships that agency cultivates, the stakeholders it engages, and the
normative interests its policies promote.19 An agency’s choice of priorities and
its allocation of acquisition resources can determine which neighborhoods see
boosted property values and which do not; which neighborhoods realize health
and civic wellness gains and which do not; and, broadly, how shared public
amenities are distributed in a given community.20 The aggregate impact of
parkland distribution is seen starkly in cities and counties across the United
States. Just over two-thirds of Americans can walk to a local park, which means
about one-third cannot, whereas parks in majority non-white areas serve five
times as many people as parks that serve majority white populations.21
Priorities that make sense in a small-scale context may prove uneven in their
large-scale application, a challenge for both policymakers and for the
communities they govern.
In short, then, the location of new public parkland has ramifications for
local residents and for local governance. Yet stakeholders are given few
signposts in setting acquisition priorities and monitoring acquisition programs.
Data on parkland acquisition is scarce.22 The legal framework undergirding the

18. Compare Telephone Interview with Stephanie Kutsko, Land Prot. Manager, Cleveland
Metroparks (May 13, 2021) (using natural resource value as a criteria), with Telephone Interview with
Glenn Boorman, supra note 11 (discussing the turn to brownfield parks development); An Overview
of
EPA’s
Browsfield
Program,
U.S.
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-epas-brownfields-program
[https://perma.cc/K8VTQCQE] (“A brownfield is a property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant.”).
19. See infra Part III(C) (exploring the ecosystem of stakeholder participation). See also Jennifer
Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 471–72 (2015) (exploring the role of internal
priority-setting within federal agencies).
20. See infra Part I(A).
21. KATHARINE LUSK, BOS. UNIV., SONGHYUN PARK, KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DAVID
M. GLICK, MAXWELL PALMER & STACY FOX, URBAN PARKS AND THE PUBLIC REALM: EQUITY &
ACCESS IN POST-COVID CITIES 3 (2020). See also THE TR. FOR PUB. LAND, THE HEAT IS ON 2
(2020),
https://www.tpl.org/sites/default/files/The-Heat-is-on_A-Trust-for-Public-Land_specialreport_r10.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVY6-VVZV] (discussing park distribution inequities); infra Part
III(B) (exploring access inequities and the concept of environmental justice).
22. Valuable governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the field of open space
management track important local park metrics, including comparative data regarding the acreage held
by local park agencies in the United States. See 2020 City Park Facts, THE TR. FOR PUB. LAND
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process is rarely explored, particularly at the local government level.23 And
although local governments are America’s leading stewards and gatekeepers of
public park property, the actions of a park agency when acquiring new land
receive bare direction from the formal legal regime and little attention from
legal scholars.24 Instead, state law and judicial precedent grants almost
unconstrained local discretion when acquiring parkland, a framework that
delegates lawmaking to the lowest level of governance: to the local and sublocal
institutions whose internal policies and unwritten practices determine what
parkland is acquired, how potential land acquisitions are reviewed, and which
stakeholders and priorities carry most weight in the process.25 Viewed as a
whole, these policies and practices constitute an informal, heterogeneous legal
regime of local parkland acquisition.
This Article sheds light on this informal legal regime. Faced with a dearth
of national data on parkland acquisition, it aims to identify where parkland is
actually being acquired, employing an empirical review of property recently
obtained for park purposes at many of the largest local departments and
authorities across the United States.26 The Article then analyzes this data
https://www.tpl.org/2020-city-park-facts [https://perma.cc/X3C2-N4LE]. The Trust for Public Land
has also prepared national-level reports on greenspace location, see, e.g., ParkServe, THE TR. FOR PUB.
LAND https://parkserve.tpl.org/mapping/ [https://perma.cc/WHB8-5U22], and local-level studies and
planning reports for specific entities, see, e.g., Barnegat Bay 2020: A Vision for the Future of
Conservation,
THE
T R.
FOR
PUB.
LAND
(July
2008),
https://www.tpl.org/sites/default/files/cloud.tpl.org/pubs/local-nj-barnegat-bay-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EWW-PTWQ]. Yet national-level data on recent property acquisitions is not
aggregated and difficult to collect. All data collected for this Article was obtained through direct
outreach to ninety-four departments and authorities. See infra Part III(A) (explaining the
methodology). The majority of these departments and authorities did not provide acquisition data until
a public records request was submitted.
23. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Park acquisition has received more attention at
the state and federal levels. See, e.g., Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice,
and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (discussing the creation of federal wildlife
refuges through acquisition); Sean Flaherty & Anthony Moffa, Conserving A Vision: Acadia,
Katahdin, and the Pathway from Private Hands to Park Lands, 71 ME. L. REV. 37 (2018) (exploring
the creation of national parks in Maine); Rachel E. Deming, Protecting Natural Resources-Forever:
The Obligations of State Officials to Uphold “Forever” Constitutional Provisions, 36 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 202, 206–07 (2019) (discussing conservation land acquisition under the Florida Forever
program).
24. See Steven M. Davis, The Politics of Urban Natural Areas Management at the Local Level:
A Case Study, 2 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 127, 127 (2010) (noting that public park
management at the local level is rarely explored, notwithstanding the fact that local parks dwarf federal
parks in size and visitors).
25. See infra Part III.
26. For purposes of this Article, “parkland” and “park properties” are synonyms and defined
broadly, drawing upon the definition used by the Trust for Public Land to include parcels owned in fee
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against the policies and practices that drove each acquisition. In doing so, it
builds a framework for understanding sublocal acquisition regimes and for
arbitrating between oft-competing values of efficiency and access—while at the
same time assessing the normative role of institutional informality, both in the
parkland context and for local governance more broadly.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Following this introduction, Part I sets
the stakes. It argues that park acquisition is consequential for local
communities, despite often operating under the radar, because parks are vital
public amenities: they generate health and economic benefits for surrounding
neighborhoods and impact how resources and residents disperse across a
locality. The crucial geographic decision made by local stakeholders—where
to create parkland—can thus serve to reduce or reinforce interlocal disparities.
Studying these decisions offers scholars a window into thorny questions of local
government that populate the legal literature, in particular those that confront
tensions inherent in sublocal structures. This part explores how parkland
acquisition can pull back the opaque institutional veil of sublocal lawmaking in
order to explore its governance outcomes.
Having established why local park acquisition is worth examining, Part II
offers a descriptive account of the regime: it moves down the vertical chain of
government power, tracing the devolution of acquisition authority from the
state to the local to the sublocal level, ending with an assessment of the
stakeholders who hold an operative voice in the process. This part draws upon
statutes, ordinances, interviews, and internal agency documents to sketch the
contours of this acquisition regime, one that is forged out of sublocal policies
and institutional cultures rather than external law. In doing so, however, this
part argues that despite its hazy and heterogeneous nature, there are salient ways
in which the legal framework of park acquisition can shape, and be shaped by,
on-the-ground institutional practice. Part II concludes by exploring how
proactive governance can yield stakeholder diversity in the acquisition
ecosystem.

simple by a local governmental entity that contain open greenspace and permit public access. The
ParkServe Database, How do we define a park?, THE TR. FOR PUB. LAND
https://www.tpl.org/parkserve/about#faq02 [https://perma.cc/7NY6-LTK6]. Whether a given parcel
constitutes “park property” was determined by the responsive local agencies included in this study,
which at times distinguished between multiple subcategories of properties, for example between
community parks and open space sites. See, e.g., Aurora Parks, Recreation & Open Space Department,
Acquisition Parcels 2010 to 2021 (Mar. 11, 2021) (on file with author) (breaking down park properties
into conservation areas, community parks, greenbelts, neighborhood parks, and special use parks). In
accordance with the broad designations utilized by the Trust for Public Land, all such subcategories
were considered to describe park properties for purposes of this Article.
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Part III puts our sublocal acquisition framework to the test. Using data from
5,120 park properties acquired over the past decade, it performs geospatial and
statistical analyses to determine where parkland is being acquired in local
communities across the country, what normative civic values are promoted by
these acquisitions, and, crucially, how local institutional structures translate
into geographic outcomes. The study specifically examines two values shared
widely by local park agencies: first, the value of expanding existing greenspace
through adjacent or proximal land acquisitions, and second, as introduced
above, the oft-conflicting value of creating new parks in areas that have
historically lacked them. How do an agency’s priorities translate into park
creation? What features of an acquisition regime yield more park properties?
Which promote better acquisition outcomes? In offering some initial answers
to these questions, this part reveals that equity challenges persist in park
creation and further demonstrates the values of formality and stakeholder
diversity in local acquisition schemes. The Article concludes by drawing upon
these empirical results to advocate for state legislatures to modestly boost the
guidance they provide sublocal actors.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PARK ACQUISITION REGIME
Why study the legal regime of local parkland acquisition? Of the 5,120
acquisitions reviewed for this Article, the majority, if not the vast majority,
were acquired without public controversy.27 Few were subject to critical media
coverage or judicial review.28 In contrast with the case where a park is being
sold by a local entity—a flashpoint situation where the government may face

27. To be sure, an acquisition’s notoriety or lack thereof is impossible to quantify, but a review
of acquisition data indicates that a substantial volume of park properties are small in size, obtained
from other governmental and/or nonprofit entities and via donation, factors that do not tend to
aggravate public attention. See, e.g., Response to Public Records Request from City of Dallas to
Wendy Xu, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law (Apr. 14, 2021) (on file with author) (providing
a list of acquisitions since 2010; the list includes notes regarding the nature of the acquisition and size
of each parcel; of the sixty properties listed, forty-four are smaller than one acre); San Antonio Parks
& Recreation, List of Park Inventory (Feb. 24, 2021) (on file with author) (showing that only sixteen
of fifty-six recent acquisitions occurred via purchase).
28. A notable exception occurred in St. Louis County, where parkland was conveyed as part of
an exchange to acquire park property elsewhere, a transaction later exposed as a case of possible
favoritism between the then-County Executive, Steve Stenger, who later plead guilty to a play-to-pay
scheme, and a donor to his campaign. Jacob Barker, Stenger Quietly Gave 60 Acres of Park Land to
Donor in Exchange for 15 Acres, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 8, 2019),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/stenger-quietly-gave-60-acres-of-park-landto-donor-in-exchange-for-15-acres/article_0939d797-0ba4-56bf-91f6-462abf65bcf4.html
[https://perma.cc/PLL9-7JPK]. See also Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, Cont. Manager, St.
Louis Cnty. Dept. of Parks and Recreation (Mar. 2, 2021) (on file with author) (discussing the episode).
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criticism for privatizing public assets or reducing public greenspace29—
acquisition does trigger polarizing debates. The concept of parkland creation
is not politically partisan.30 Nor is it one that generally raises the specter of
government impropriety.31
Under the radar, however, the transfer of property to a parks department or
authority has real ramifications for the residents of a local community, even if
it doesn’t make headlines in the press—and it cuts to the core of local
governance, even if traditional legal doctrines do not speak directly to the issue.
In particular, park property acquisition matters because the location of parkland
informs growth, development, conservation, and health in a community.32
Likewise the process of deciding to acquire a specific parcel of land for park
29. See, e.g., Seth Koenig, Portland City Council Approves Controversial Sale of Publicly
Owned
Congress
Square
Park,
BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS
(Sept.
16,
2013),
https://bangordailynews.com/2013/09/16/news/portland-city-council-set-to-decide-monday-oncontroversial-congress-square-plaza-sale/
[https://perma.cc/2VPY-HHYZ];
Kevin
Canfield,
Oklahoma Supreme Court Sends Helmerich Park Lawsuit Back to District Court, TULSA WORLD (June
30, 2021), https://tulsaworld.com/news/local/oklahoma-supreme-court-sends-helmerich-park-lawsuitback-to-district-court/article_9df5d85a-d378-11eb-ab4b-e7b137a0332a.html
[https://perma.cc/GX7N-J8PV].
30. Most data on public support for parkland comes from the national level, where there is broad
support for national parks and federal park investments. Marcia Argust, Americans Want Congress to
Act to Fix National Parks, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2019/08/09/americans-want-congress-toact-to-fix-national-parks [https://perma.cc/DR92-C4EF] (showing broad national support for
investment in national parks); Carl Brown, See America First: Public Opinion and National Parks,
ROPER CTR FOR PUB. OP. RES., https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/see-america-first-public-opinion-andnational-parks [https://perma.cc/9PGE-YKJH] (showing national support for investment into new
federal park creation, yet with a shift towards maintenance and conservation over acquisition over
time). A 2020 study found strong support for local government investment in infrastructure
improvements that promote economic activity, with parkland as one such form of infrastructure. See
Press Release, National Recreation and Park Association, New Survey: Nine in 10 U.S. Adults Support
Local Government Investments in Infrastructure Improvements to Promote Economic Activity in their
Communities (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.newswise.com/articles/new-survey-nine-in-10-u-s-adultssupport-local-government-investments-in-infrastructure-improvements-to-promote-economicactivity-in-their-communities [https://perma.cc/2ZDT-VW2Y].
31. Pursuant to one line of traditional theory, local government is more susceptible to capture by
factions and to public corruption. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. Yet watchdog
organizations that track state and local-level corruption do not identify, or at least do not report, any
pattern of impropriety in the parkland acquisition context. See, e.g., Austin Berg, 2019–2020 Illinois
corruption tracker, ILL. POL’Y, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/2019-illinois-corruptiontracker/ [https://perma.cc/29B7-745A]. And charges of impropriety were rare across the 5,120
properties reviewed for this Article. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part I(A). On the importance of locational decisions in local government, see
generally Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
637 (2012); Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity As Property, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 647, 674–77
(2014).
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purposes—which by its nature also raises geographic considerations—demands
that local administrators, staffers, and other stakeholders forge a system of
governance out of a meager legal framework, a scheme which offers insight
into the values and drawbacks of local governance institutions.
A. Acquisition and Local Communities
Acquisition is a powerful tool of public greenspace development. On the
federal level, acquisition has long played a central role in bringing natural areas
into the public domain and promoting resource conservation.33 Congress has
empowered federal agencies with the authority and funds to pursue land
acquisition opportunities, coupled with a mandate requiring that federal
agencies maintain their public landholdings over time.34 State governments
share the sentiment and pour significant resources into parkland acquisition.35
For local government, too, land acquisition serves as a crucial vehicle for
accomplishing normative goals, including efforts to expand greenspace,
conserve resources threatened by development, and promote recreational
opportunities and amenities.36 Fee simple acquisition helps further these
33. See Fink, supra note 23, at 30–31 (discussing the history of wildlife refuges; land was
acquired for wildlife refuges both before a conservation policy was put into place by Congress, serving
as the impetus for broader policy developments, and as a consequence of the policy that followed).
34. See Nicholas G. Vaskov, Continued Cartographic Chaos, or A New Paradigm in Public
Land Reconfiguration? The Effect of New Laws Authorizing Limited Sales of Public Land, 20 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 79, 85 (2002) (discussing the retention mandate under the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976). Despite the federal focus on maintaining and growing public lands,
the emphasis on acquisition has declined over time; as compared with federal land policy in the 19th
century, the prevailing policy focus today is to retain and manage existing resources. See Jan G. Laitos
& Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 147 (1999).
35. See, e.g., Lawrence Mower, Florida is Buying $300 Million in Land. It’s for the
Environment—and
Developers.,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(July
26,
2021),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/2021/07/26/florida-is-buying-300-million-in-landits-for-the-environment-and-developers/ [https://perma.cc/XNQ6-2UJU].
36. See Barnegat Bay 2020, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that land acquisition is “vital” for
conservation in the Barnegat Bay watershed of coastal New Jersey); Telephone Interview with Allen
Ishibashi, supra note 17 (describing fee simple acquisition as the main vehicle for conservation); Cook
County Forest Preserve District, 2012 Land Acquisition Plan 5 (Oct. 2012) (on file with author)
(explaining the agency’s rationale for expanding its park inventory). But see Telephone Interview with
Clement Lau, supra note 17 (stating that Los Angeles County prioritizes non-acquisition approaches
to parkland expansion because fee simple acquisition is challenging in a built-out urban environment).
Local governments increasingly find themselves at the forefront of environmental conservation. See
generally Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental Renaissance, 108
CAL. L. REV. 305, 307 (2020). See also A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity:
What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555 (1993); Jamison E. Colburn, Localism’s Ecology:
Protecting and Restoring Habitat in the Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 945, 953 (2006);
Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28 (discussing how St. Louis County partners with
nonprofit conservation organizations in its acquisition efforts).
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multifaceted outcomes by offering short- and long-term management flexibility
that easements and shared-use agreements do not.37 Given that passions rise
when parkland disposition is on the table, it follows that the location and extent
of local park acquisition matters, as well. When an acquisition is contemplated
but not pursued by the local government, thus leaving a prospective park parcel
in private hands, the normative impact of the government’s non-action may be
no different from the more charged situation where a park property gets
disposed into private ownership. The location of a new park furthers microlocal
recreation values, just as those values may be impeded by a park that is disposed
or by an acquisition that is never made.38
Empirical research supports the geographic import of parkland acquisition.
Parks are economic engines: they boost property values in surrounding
neighborhoods and attract amenities and development.39 Parks also serve
environmental objectives by mitigating against pollution and urban heat

37. Telephone Interview with Bill Maasen, supra note 3 (discussing management limitations
when parkland is held by easement); Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, Env’t Planner, City
of Columbus Recreation and Parks Dept. (July 6, 2021) (notes on file with author) (discussing
management and investment limitations when parkland is held by long-term lease); Atlanta Dept. of
Parks and Recreation, Park Acquisition Approval Procedures 12 (May 12, 2021) (on file with author)
(noting that conservation easements are rarely used as a tool for greenspace creation, and only under
particular circumstances); Denver Parks and Recreation, Strategic Acquisition Plan 36 (Apr. 2021) (on
file with author) (“Fee acquisitions have the advantage of giving [the agency] full control over the
management of the properties’ resources and provide the greatest flexibility for future use and decision
making. Most [Denver] acquisitions for parks and open spaces will be fee simple acquisitions.”). But
see Resol. No. 2004-80, Volusia Cnty. Council 4 (2004) (on file with author) (recognizing that
“significant conservation goals can be achieved by alternatives to traditional fee simple acquisition”).
38. The concept can be illustrated through the emphasis many local park agencies place upon
maintaining a certain number of parkland acres per 1,000 residents. See, e.g., Austin Parks and
Recreation Dept., Parkland Acquisition Program (Dec. 2, 2020) (on file with author) (expressing a goal
of twenty-four acres per 1,000 residents); Portland Parks and Recreation, Land Acquisition Strategy
(2016) (on file with author) (targeting twenty acres per 1,000 residents); City of Colorado Springs,
Updates Made to the Parkland Dedication Ordinance, What They Mean (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://coloradosprings.gov/parks/article/news/updates-made-parkland-dedication-ordinance-whatthey [https://perma.cc/8HXR-QAA7] (targeting 5.5 acres per 1,000 residents).
39. See Molly Espey & Kwame Owusu-Edusei, Neighborhood Parks and Residential Property
Values in Greenville, South Carolina, 33 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 487, 491 (2001); Heather Sander
& Stephen Polasky, The Value of Views and Open Space: Estimates From a Hedonic Pricing Model
for Ramsey County, Minnesota, USA, 26 LAND USE POL’Y 837, 844 (2009); William W. Buzbee,
Sprawl’s Political-Economy and the Case for A Metropolitan Green Space Initiative, 32 URB. LAW.
367, 384 (2000); Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 36, at 317; Kibel, supra note 14, at 369 (positing
that hillside parkland may have facilitated the development of affluent neighborhoods nearby).

ROSENBAUM_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

A LEGAL MAP OF NEW LOCAL PARKLAND

733

effects,40 preserving threatened species,41 and discouraging sprawl.42 In
addition, parks advance public health and civic wellness; they promote physical
activity in a neighborhood and create fora for members of the community to
congregate and interact.43 This is not to say that parks are unassailable public
goods. Social scientists debate whether parks spur increased crime in
surrounding neighborhoods, for example,44 and urban parks have been
associated with regressive land use planning and gentrification.45 But for
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to highlight the intuitive central point:
public parkland has empirical value. Its impacts are not evenly distributed
across a city or region, moreover, but instead are hyper-local in nature, such
that the benefits (and detriments) of parks are most pronounced in the blocks
and communities that are more proximal or accessible to a park site.46 The
40. See Lusk, supra note 21, at 3.
41. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 385 (observing that “metropolitan area green spaces can
provide rare ecosystem fragments”); Álvaro Luna, Pedro Romero-Vidal, Fernando Heraldo & Jose L.
Tella, Cities May Save Some Threatened Species But Not Their Ecological Functions, PEERJ (June 22,
2018), https://peerj.com/articles/4908/ [https://perma.cc/47UV-DJ4H].
42. Kathy Blah, How Cities Use Parks for Smart Growth, The City Parks Forum Briefing Paper,
AM. PLAN. ASS’N. (2005), https://www.brec.org/assets/General_Info/Why_R_Parks_Important/Pape
rs/Parks-for-Smart-Growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA76-GXLR] (providing local-level examples).
43. Andrew T. Kaczynski, Luke R. Potwarka, Bryan J. A. Smale & Mark E. Havitz, Association
of Parkland Proximity with Neighborhood and Park-based Physical Activity: Variations by Gender
and Age, 31 LEISURE SCI. 174, 175 (2009) (regarding physical activity among neighborhood residents);
Ana Isabel Ribeiro, Andrea Pires, Marilia Sá Carvalho & Maria Fátima Pina, Distance to Parks and
Non-Residential Destinations Influences Physical Activity of Older People, But Crime Doesn’t: A
Cross-Sectional Study in a Southern European City, 15 BMC PUB. HEALTH 593, 598 (2015) (same);
Lusk, supra note 21, at 3 (regarding physical and mental health); Parks and the Pandemic, THE TR.
FOR PUB. LAND (2020), https://www.tpl.org/sites/default/files/Parks%20and%20Pandemic%20%20TPL%20special%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YWW-7M56] (regarding the impact of park
usage on health during the COVID-19 pandemic); ERIC KLINENBERG, PALACES FOR THE PEOPLE:
HOW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE CAN HELP FIGHT INEQUALITY, POLARIZATION, AND THE DECLINE OF
CIVIC LIFE 22 (2019) (regarding the social value of public spaces, including parks); Buzbee, supra
note 39, at 384 (regarding communal interactions). But see Deliana Kostova, Can the Built
Environment Reduce Obesity? The Impact of Residential Sprawl and Neighborhood Parks on Obesity
and Physical Activity, 37 E. ECON. J. 390 (2011) (reporting mixed findings on the correlation between
park access and obesity).
44. See Elizabeth Groff & Eric McCord, The Role of Neighborhood Parks as Crime Generators,
25 SEC. J. 1, 1–2 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2011.1 [https://perma.cc/JBZ5-3CUT].
45. See Sarah Fox, Environmental Gentrification, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 803, 821–823 (2019)
(discussing the “unintended negative consequences” of new park projects, including the gentrification
and displacement that can accompany them).
46. See Sander & Polasky, supra note 39, at 837 (finding that home prices “increase with closer
proximity to parks, trails, lakes, and streams”); James W. Kitchen & William S. Hendon, Land Values
Adjacent to an Urban Neighborhood Park, 43 LAND ECON. 357, 360 (1967) (finding that “as a parcel
of land is more distant from the park, its value decreases”). Operating upon the proximity model, the
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process of acquiring and locating a park property therefore comes packaged
with weighty socioeconomic externalities. In metropolitan regions, segregated
along class, race, and ethnic lines,47 creating greenspace in one suburb or
neighborhood necessarily generates economic, health, and civic spillovers that
can disproportionately affect particular demographic constituencies.48 The
distribution of parks can thus serve to reduce or reinforce interlocal disparities.
Parkland distribution also matters for the basic reason that residents of a
community care about park access. The public has long held an aesthetic and
recreational interest in park expansion, heralded first by the Progressive Era’s
beatification movement,49 reinforced more recently by prominent urban and
suburban revitalization projects,50 and then brought back to the forefront when
park attendance soared during the COVID-19 pandemic.51 Today parks are
prime local amenities.
A community rich in greenspace and other
environmental amenities enjoys an edge in the interlocal competition for skilled
workers and mobile capital.52 Because parks impact regional equities, they act
as interlocal public goods that inform the housing decisions of mobile

Trust for Public Land releases an annual “ParkScore” that assesses local park proximity and access in
major American cities. See The ParkScore index: Methodology and FAQ, THE TR. FOR PUB. LAND,
https://www.tpl.org/parkscore/about [https://perma.cc/48V5-U8HM]. The ParkScore report uses a 10minute walkable service area around each park to determine parkland access. Id.
47. See, e.g., Stephen Menendian, Arthur Gailes & Samir Gambhir, The Roots of Structural
Racism: Twenty-First Century Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, OTHERING &
BELONGING
INST.
(2021),
https://belonging.berkeley.edu/roots-structural-racism
[https://perma.cc/F5TB-AHNE] (finding high and increasing rates of metropolitan racial segregation).
48. See Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 36, at 336–37.
49. See Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 36, at 317.
50. The High Line in New York City is one of the more prominent examples of a major
greenspace project as a form of urban economic revitalization. See Kate Ascher & Sabina Uffer, The
High Line Effect, COUNCIL ON TALL BUILDINGS AND URB. HABITAT (2015),
https://global.ctbuh.org/resources/papers/download/2463-the-high-line-effect.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46LS-RP2H]. Other urban efforts have attracted public support for their ability to
turn abandoned, vacant, or contaminated spaces into public goods. See Charles C. Branas, Rose A.
Cheney, John M. MacDonald, Vicky W. Tam, Tara D. Jackson & Thomas R. Ten Have, A Differencein-Differences Analysis of Health, Safety, and Greening Vacant Urban Space, 174 AM. J. OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1296–97 (2011) (studying a vacant lot greening program in Philadelphia). Outside
urban cores, parkland creation facilitates habitat conservation, trail connectivity, and flood
management. See, e.g., Hailey Konnath, Flanagan Lake, Opening This Week, Is Already Spurring
Development In Northwest Omaha, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (June 25, 2018),
https://omaha.com/business/flanagan-lake-opening-this-week-is-already-spurring-development-innorthwest-omaha/article_96aad718-10fc-5701-85c8-d91c013454e7.html
[https://perma.cc/6JM5T27R].
51. Parks and the Pandemic, supra note 43, at 5–6.
52. See Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 36, at 327 (discussing the modern role of
environmental amenities in interlocal competition).
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residents—and impede the prosperity of communities left behind.53 Under the
Tieboutian model of regional competition, a greenspace investment in one
municipality can serve to attract new residents, bringing mobile capital into that
area and away from other parts of the region.54 For local officials, the desire to
attract residents and satisfy their preferences serves as an incentive to invest in
park amenities.55
But where an official’s jurisdiction extends over a large city, county, or
metropolitan region, Tieboutian incentives become more complicated. Placing
a park in one area of the jurisdiction picks winners and losers on a sublocal
level, with the potential that these decisions facilitate intralocal migratory and
investment patterns as residents sort themselves based upon their affinity for
greenspace—or alternatively on their ability to pay a premium for its
proximity.56 The power of local parkland cuts both ways under this dynamic.
On the one hand, it offers targeted flexibility to local administrators: for
example, creating a park can promote and regulate entry into a specific
neighborhood that has suffered from divestment, even as the local government
can conserve resources by simultaneously choosing not to create a park in
another neighborhood that does not have the same need.57 On the other hand,
however, sublocal decision-making is prone to externalities and problems of
scale. Where the jurisdictional scale is too small, local park administrators may

53. Along these lines, a park may also induce migrations away from a neighborhood because it
causes property values to rise. See Nestor M. Davidson & David Fagundes, Law and Neighborhood
Names, 72 VAND. L. REV. 757, 818 (2019) (discussing how Tieboutian forces can promote both entry
and displacement on a neighborhood level).
54. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422
(1956). See also Noah M. Kazis, Service Provision and the Study of Local Legislatures: A Response
to Professor Zale, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 1, 11 (2020) (describing the concept of the model and its
empirical underpinning support); Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J.
564, 600 (2017) (discussing competition for economic development and local amenities). But see
Richard Schragger, Does Governance Matter? The Case of Business Improvement Districts and the
Urban Resurgence, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 49, 66 (2010) (describing the concept of competition between
localities as “incoherent”).
55. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Bankruptcy, Essential Municipal Services, and
Taxpayers’ Voice, 24 WIDENER L.J. 43, 44 (2015).
56. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 503, 527 (1997) (discussing “intralocal mobility within big cities”). See also Davidson &
Fagundes, supra note 53, at 818 (noting that “movement between localities can express and sort
preferences for public amenities,” a process that “very actively plays out within cities at the
neighborhood level”).
57. See Davidson & Fagundes, supra note 53, at 818 (discussing targeted investment as a means
of regulating entry and exit on a neighborhood level); Briffault, supra note 56, at 527 (discussing
targeted sublocal mechanisms for encouraging Tieboutian mobility).
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lack the resources to acquire new greenspace,58 but geographic blind spots may
emerge in parkland governance where the scale is too large, at times
intentionally (e.g., where multiple parks entities are hesitant to act in an area of
jurisdictional overlap59) and at times unintentionally (e.g., where a corner of the
county lacks an outspoken constituency advocating for conservation60).
These intentional and unintentional choices spawn geographic outcomes.
When plotted on a map, the distribution of park space hints at the dispersal of
other resources and public goods in a community—and at the local policies that
allocate them.
B. Acquisition and Local Governance
The above discussion of parkland acquisition’s role within a community
highlights a predominant organizing theme. When a new property is acquired
for parks purposes, the administrative decision to obtain that specific parcel of
land is intertwined with considerations and incentives that operate at a micro,
neighborhood-scale level. Similarly, when the parcel is ultimately turned into
a public park, the resulting greenspace also has civic impacts that are most
prominently micro and proximal in character.
It is not only parkland outcomes and impacts that manifest at the local level.
Park governance also occurs in this space. Because decisions to create and
expand local parkland are routinely made below the formal lawmaking radar of
state legislatures, city councils, and county commissions—and instead, are
driven by the internal policies of the agencies and authorities empowered to
manage them61—park acquisition can be said to operate in the realm of the
sublocal.62 Recently, legal scholars have begun to assess the ways in which
58. See Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 63, 104–05 (2013) (discussing the value of public goods, including open space, being
provided on a regional scale); Janice C. Griffith, Institutional Framework for Open Space
Conservation, 4 J. COMP. URB. L. & POL’Y 235, 259 (2020) (noting that open space conservation
crosses boundary lines, and thus require regional implementation). See also Nicole Stelle Garnett,
Governing? Gentrifying? Seceding? Real-Time Answers to Questions About Business Improvement
Districts, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 35, 45–46 (2010) (discussing the “Secession of the Successful”).
59. See Davidson, supra note 54, at 600 (explaining the regulatory gaps and administrative
overlaps that occurred in the fragmented space of local governance). Nearly all of the park agencies
reviewed for this Article have jurisdictions that overlap with those of other park agencies, including in
places with each other.
60. See infra Part III(C) (regarding the role and impact of participation).
61. See infra Part III.
62. Commentators have explored a variety of institutions that fall under the umbrella of sublocal
or microlocal governance, including special districts, local public agencies, formal and informal
community groups, and other processes, both official and unofficial, that play out below the municipal
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sublocal governance puts central theories of local government law into stark
relief.63 Traditional local government theory rests upon a central dichotomy: a
debate between the optimistic view first famously expressed by Alexis de
Tocqueville, who described local governments as labs of democratic
experimentation,64 and the more pessimistic view set forth by James Madison
in the Federalist Papers, who worried that devolution to smaller units of
government would increase the odds a faction captures and exploits the levers
of power to the detriment of the minority.65
Sublocal governance puts this traditional dichotomy under a microscope.
At the sublocal level, the Tocquevillian view of local experimentation is even
more pronounced; not only can cities and counties adopt different policy
approaches from one another, but so too can administrative agencies,
neighborhood institutions, and community groups within those jurisdictions
experiment as well.66 Experimentation in the parkland context could produce
tailored acquisition plans that respond narrowly to conditions on the ground. A
local parks department in a low-lying coastal area can prioritize adding new
park space in floodplains; a regional authority in a wealthy suburban area can

level. See Briffault, supra note 56, at 508 (describing as sublocal “enterprise zones, tax increment
finance districts, special zoning districts, and business improvement districts”); Daniel B. Rodriguez
& Nadav Shoked, Comparative Local Government Law in Motion: How Different Local Government
Law Regimes Affect Global Cities’ Bike Share Plans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123, 163 (2014)
(discussing formal and informal sublocal and micro-local institutions, including boroughs, districts,
neighborhood associations, commerce boards, and others); Davidson & Fagundes, supra note 53, at
811–12 (describing sublocal institutions to include “business improvement districts, neighborhood
advisory councils, enterprise zones, tax increment finance districts, special zoning districts,
neighborhood courts, neighborhood schools, and others”); Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L.
REV. 1323, 1327–29 (2014). These commentators do not share interchangeable definitions of sublocal
and micro-local. Professor Shoked, for example, defines as “micro local” the indirect expressions of
local governance that sit below cities, counties, and special districts, in contrast with sublocal
institutions that have a unitary decision-making body. See id. at 1336. This Article will use “sublocal”
as an umbrella term to characterize parkland acquisition regimes, where decisions are generally made
at a level of local governance below the unitary and formal. See infra Part III.
63. See Shoked, The New Local, supra note 62, at 1327 (“Without legal commentators noticing
it, localism in contemporary American law is more local than ever before.”).
64. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) 62–78 (1787). See also Michael Heller &
Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1499 (2008) (“Since Madison’s
Federalist No. 10, it has been a bromide of American political theory that, as one shrinks the size of a
jurisdiction, one increases the likelihood that a majority of the jurisdiction’s residents will share a
common interest in oppressing the minority.”). For an overview of the Madisonian and Tocquevillian
views in the local government framework, see Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing
Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 404–07
(2002).
66. See Davidson, supra note 54, at 625–28.
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expand its inventory via philanthropic donations from private landowners; and
an urban park district in a post-industrial city can aim to create pocket parks out
of vacant parcels. Devolution of power supports these varied missions.
At the same time, however, fragmenting power at the sublocal level risks
the Madisonian concern of factionalism and parochialism, this time not simply
as a matter of city or state power but also within and between local
neighborhoods, too.67 Sublocal governance might empower those who are most
knowledgeable about local conditions, facilitating efficient and participatory
democracy.68 But it also might not.69 Overlapping or coterminous sublocal
park agencies could work together to coordinate acquisition planning; but they
also might not, leaving inefficiencies and governance gaps in their wake.70
Sublocal governance is defined by this tension. At the sublocal level, the
dearth of formal procedures breeds instead an environment of informality,
where stakeholders act and interact without imbedded rubrics to guide their
behavior.71 Informality encapsulates many of the fundamental benefits and
drawbacks of sublocal power devolution. When legal systems are less formal,
park agencies are given freer rein to be flexible, nimble, and creative in
response—to modify priorities over time as demographics shift, land use
patterns evolve, politicians come and go, and unexpected opportunities arise.72
But adaptive decisions can yield results that are, or that appear to be, inequitable
67. See generally Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 139
(2016); Davidson & Fagundes, supra note 53.
68. Shoked, supra note 62, at 1331. See also Malcolm Lavoie, Property and Local Knowledge,
70 CATH. U. L. REV. 637, 639 (advocating for decentralized authority as a way to benefit from unique
local knowledge about property conditions).
69. See Shoked, supra note 62, at 1332 (“Sometimes, micro-local government promotes these
values; sometimes, it defeats them.”).
70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory gaps and administrative
overlaps); Kibel, supra note 14, at 400 (discussing the value of collaboration between regional park
agencies and city agencies that share jurisdictional overlap and are relatively more resourceconstrained); Telephone Interview with Clement Lau, supra note 17 (noting that Los Angeles County
coordinates with the City of Los Angeles on parkland management policies, promoting efficiency and
better management practices). Fragmented bureaucracies face coordination challenges that might
actually impede their ability to serve the marginalized groups sublocal governance is conceptually
expected to reach. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
1083, 1083 (2018).
71. See Patience A. Crowder, “Ain’t No Sunshine”: Examining Informality and State Open
Meetings Acts As the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 TENN. L. REV.
623, 637 (2007) (defining and discussing informality at the local level); Davidson, supra note 54, at
604 (noting informality as a salient feature among local administrative agencies).
72. See Telephone Interview with Kelly Grissman, supra note 16 (discussing the flexibility to
take advantage of out-of-the-box opportunities); Telephone Interview with Paul Sun, supra note 15
(discussing evolution alongside political change); Telephone Interview with Glenn Boorman, supra
note 11 (discussing flexibility to respond to demographic and land use changes).
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and unprofitable: because informal regimes enable case-by-case policymaking,
they heighten the risk of ad hoc and opaque outcomes, potentially casting a pall
of illegitimacy over the process even when those outcomes do not come to
pass.73 These promises and perils of informality surface across a variety of
sublocal disputes.74
Yet informality is not necessarily an all-encompassing feature of sublocal
governance. External directives and internal policies can always add a degree
of formality to sublocal lawmaking.75 Where local bureaucrats are handed a
vague and ill-defined administrative framework, they are given a choice about
how to fill out the blank spaces of their operative mission. They can leave those
blanks vague and ill-defined, which in practice can yield a more flexible yet
passive approach to governance, or they can build an internal structure that
departs somewhat, for better or worse, from the default informality of sublocal
administration.76 Or they can aim to forge a hybrid combination of informal,
yet proactive governance.77
Local park agencies experiment with each of these approaches, at times
yielding an internal acquisition regime significantly more formal than one
would expect from sublocal government. A striking example is offered by the
Park & Recreation Department of Miami-Dade County, Florida, which has
developed a comprehensive corpus of plans, manuals, and charts to guide local
parkland acquisition. The Department first adopted a master plan that identifies
a long-term vision for the park system and sets forth general acquisition
priorities.78 Building on this plan, the Department then created a Park Land
73. See Casey Adams, Home Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 629, 656–61 (2018) (regarding issues of legitimacy, fairness, and utility in informal
governances); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 91, 134 (2015) (discussing “individualized and opaque” deals in the zoning context); Fink, supra
note 23, at 61–62 (discussing ad hoc federal decision-making when policy is implemented at the
regional level).
74. See, e.g., Davidson & Fagundes, supra note 53, at 814 (exploring the role of informality
where neighborhood names are established and contested).
75. See infra notes 86–92 and accompanying text (describing an agency, the Cleveland
Metroparks, that takes this approach).
76. Passive and reactionary government practice often goes hand-in-hand with informal
governance structures. See Davidson & Fagundes, supra note 53, at 814 (noting that in the absence of
a formal regime for local neighborhood naming, “[c]ity governments . . . most often seem to respond
to or simply ratify change on the ground”).
77. See Telephone Interview with Boe Carlson, Superintendent, Three Rivers Park Dist. (Apr.
27, 2021) (notes on file with author) (noting the value of mixing proactive and reactive acquisition
strategies); Telephone Interview with Stephanie Kutsko, supra note 18 (same).
78. See generally Parks and Open Space System Master Plan, MIAMI-DADE CNTY. PARKS,
RECREATION,
AND
OPEN
SPACE
DEP’T
(Dec.
2007),

ROSENBAUM_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

740

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:721

Acquisition Program, which prescribes criteria to apply when considering an
acquisition, provides an analysis of existing parkland locations and needs, and
identifies specific opportunities for increasing its park inventory.79 Finally, as
an ultimate piece to the puzzle, operational documents speak to the
implementation of these global visions: a flowchart addresses each stage of the
acquisition process, and an internal manual directs staff when prosecuting a fee
simple park purchase.80
Taken together, these documents mold a clear, thorough, and operative
acquisition regime, imposing a framework of internal formality upon the
geographic decisions and land conveyances that inform parkland creation. The
regime expressly ensures that acquisition decisions are made deliberatively (by
specifying particular due diligence activities81), proactively (by strategically
targeting areas of need82), and collaboratively (by bringing internal and external
stakeholders into the process83). But formality can also be counterproductive.
It can demand more time, engage too many voices, and impinge sublocal
flexibility.84 Indeed, Miami-Dade’s Park & Recreation Department candidly
acknowledges that its approach may impose burdens in the land acquisition
process.85

https://www.miamidade.gov/parksmasterplan/library/OSMP_FINAL_REPORT_entiredocument.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GM9B-C7M3].
79. Response to Public Records Request from Miami-Dade County Parks, Recreation, and Open
Spaces Department to Daniel Rosenbaum, Univ. of Detroit Mercy Sch. of L. (May 6, 2021) (on file
with author) (providing documents regarding the Park Land Acquisition Program) [hereinafter MiamiDade Response].
80. See id. (providing documents detailing the park land acquisition process as well as providing
an operations manual regarding acquisition procedures).
81. See id. (noting “additional due diligence items such as obtaining a survey, completing
review of title work, assuring no property taxes are owned for the site, or liens on the
property”).
82. See id. (emphasizing a strategic focus upon target areas).
83. The Department has developed a park acquisition flowchart that lists five internal offices and
officials with defined roles in the process. See id. (providing a “Park Land Acquisition Process” chart).
Meanwhile, the Park Land Acquisition Program includes discussion of collaboration with local
schools. See id. (providing a slideshow discussing the program).
84. A number of local officials interviewed for this Article expressed the importance of
maintaining enough flexibility to capitalize on opportunity that arises. See Telephone Interview with
Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37; Telephone Interview with Boe Carlson, supra note 77. On the issue
of having too many stakeholders with control over a resource, see, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy
of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 648–
49 (1998).
85. See Miami-Dade Response, supra note 79 (providing a document noting “Lengthy Due
Diligence Process” and “Lengthy Internal Process” as two park acquisition challenges).
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Miami’s degree of internal formality is unique. More common are park
agencies that operate with fewer guidelines and more flexibility, a formula that
captures the sublocal informality identified in legal scholarship. For example,
in contrast with Miami-Dade, neither the Cleveland Metroparks—a regional
park authority in Northeast Ohio86—nor St. Louis County Parks &
Recreation—a division of the largest county in Missouri87—have a written land
acquisition strategy or public-facing acquisition criteria.88 Neither includes
other governmental stakeholders in the process as a matter of express policy.89
Instead, Cleveland and St. Louis County operate a park acquisition regime that
more closely reflects the degree of informality expected from sublocal
governance.90
Nevertheless, the two agencies have forged different models out of their
shared base framework. Administrators at Cleveland Metroparks have used
informality to pursue a multifaceted acquisition strategy: operating from a
holistic, internal sense of park expansion priorities that may vary on a parcelby-parcel basis.91
Metroparks employees engage a wide variety of
stakeholders—including title companies, attorneys, land conservancies, and
sewer districts, among others—and employ a range of environmental and
geospatial data to pursue targeted opportunities, a process that has yielded 2,715
acres of parkland acquisition since 2010.92 These efforts are not formally
prescribed but have become imbedded into the agency’s institutional practice.
St. Louis County, meanwhile, has not adopted any such affirmative acquisition
practices, choosing instead to prioritize the maintenance of parkland it already
owns.93 As a result, it is little surprise that St. Louis County obtains park

86. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1545.01 et seq. (2020).
87. See Mo. Econ. Rsch. and Info. Ctr., County Population, MO. DEP’T OF HIGHER ED. &
WORKFORCE
DEV.,
https://meric.mo.gov/data/population/county-population
[https://perma.cc/7LKW-K3ZT].
88. See Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28; Telephone Interview with
Stephanie Kutsko, supra note 18.
89. Both have partnerships with other governmental entities. See Telephone Interview with
Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28 (discussing trail easement collaborations with Great Rivers Greenway);
Telephone Interview with Stephanie Kutsko, supra note 18 (discussing a variety of intergovernmental
partners). Yet these partnerships are not formally baked into the acquisition process and rather appear
to develop and operate more organically.
90. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
91. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Kutsko, supra note 18 (discussing how the agency
toggles base data to highlight different values with respect to different properties; also discussing the
holistic and informal nature of acquisition scoring and donation evaluations).
92. See id. (discussing geospatial criteria); Cleveland Metroparks, List of Acquisitions 2010–
2020 (Apr. 26, 2021) (on file with author).
93. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28.
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property largely through passive channels, via donation or tax delinquency, and
finds itself acquiring properties by happenstance, absent a plan to maintain
them as parkland in the near future.94
In this manner, Miami-Dade, Cleveland Metroparks, and St. Louis County
have taken differing approaches to their roles as sublocal institutions—
approaches that yield disparate acquisition outcomes on the ground. Park
agencies therefore offer a profitable field of analysis. Their acquisition regimes
can illuminate compelling civic discussions while also presenting insight into
the values and drawbacks of sublocal governance writ large. To be sure, the
delegation of power to local and sublocal entities is not a new concept, nor a
novel one.95 Yet underexplored is the institutional role of local administrators
and internal policy in this regime.96 Further underexplored is how sublocal
lawmaking truly informs governance outcomes.97 Park acquisition offers an
apt opportunity to approach these important questions.
III. LOCATING THE LAW OF PARK ACQUISITION
Despite their differing approaches, Miami, Cleveland, and St. Louis County
share a root commonality: all three agencies were given significant flexibility
to experiment and mold their own park acquisition regimes as a consequence
of power devolution to the sublocal level.98 This section locates the legal
94. See St. Louis Cnty. Dept. of Parks and Recreation, Land Acquisitions 2010–2020 (Mar. 1,
2021) (on file with author) (demonstrating that at least 13 of 17 acquisitions occurred through donation
or tax reversion); Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28 (discussing parcels donated to
the agency near Spanish Lake, Missouri).
95. See generally Kellen Zale, Part-Time Government, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 987 (2019) (exploring
the devolution of power to city managers and other local stakeholders where municipal legislatures
only serve on a part-time basis); Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 62, at 161–62 (discussing the
delegation of power to the microlocal level); Davidson & Fagundes, supra note 53, at 812 (describing
neighborhood-level actors who wield formal and informal power to define neighborhood identity);
Shoked, supra note 62, at 1327–28 (providing a number of examples). Notably, commentators have
explored the role and value of devolution in the zoning and land use context. See, e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, The Zoning Straitjacket: The Freezing of American Neighborhoods of Single-Family
Houses, 96 IND. L.J. 395, 414 (2021); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting
Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 295–96 (2011).
96. See Kazis, supra note 54, at 2 (critiquing the tendency to equate local government with
legislative bodies and overlook the role of local bureaucracies and employees in service provision);
Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 36, at 305 (discussing local policies as a form of “overlooked
lawmaking”); Rizzardi, supra note 11, at 32–34 (discussing the importance of staffing in local
governance).
97. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 73, at 135–36 (urging a focus upon the behaviors of
agencies and other “law-making institutions,” and away from common law rules, when evaluating how
land is governed today).
98. But see infra note 120 (regarding an ordinance in Miami-Dade that in certain circumstances
directs the County’s acquisition focus).
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sources and consequences of that devolution in order to sketch the salient
framework of local park acquisition law. It does so by tracing a largely
permissive path from state law to municipal ordinance to sublocal decisionmaking, in the process exploring where substantive lawmaking occurs and who
holds effective lawmaking power in the field.
Defining the legal regime of local park acquisition is at once both a
deceptively easy and maddingly difficult task. At its most basic level, the law
of parkland acquisition can be summarized succinctly: local entities enjoy
almost unconstrained power to acquire and dedicate property for park purposes,
a discretionary and broad authority to such an extent that one could argue no
legal regime exists in this space at all. In this manner, the law of parkland
acquisition offers a window into other fields of local governance and
institutional design that fall outside the scrutiny of state legislatures, and
likewise below the radar of many legal scholars.99 Scholarship on local
government law has profitably turned its gaze upwards, towards the state and
federal regimes that act to preempt local power or pose constitutional
challenges at the local level.100 But the law of local park acquisition must
primarily look down the vertical chain of government power, to the sublocal
institutions, officials, and other actors, both public and private, that determine
the issues at stake and decisions at play where a parcel is being obtained for
park usage.
The result is a heterogeneous regime of local and sublocal authority. Under
this regime, federal and state law do play starring roles in certain noteworthy
cases, none more prominent than where a local government is attempting to
acquire parkland via eminent domain. Some local parks entities are expressly
prohibited by law from pursuing eminent domain,101 whereas others are given
limited grants of this power.102 Yet eminent domain is politically fraught and
routinely approached as a last-resort option by local government

99. Removed from debates over state preemption and limited local power, there are broad and
disparate areas of law where local governments enjoy significant latitude. See Davidson, supra note
54, at 588 (noting that “local governments have long exercised significant regulatory authority through
the auspices of local agencies”); Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 62, at 149–53 (plotting local power
along an “empowerment continuum” and providing examples of strong local power).
100. See, e.g., RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE
(2016).
101. See, e.g., ANCHORAGE, AK., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25.20.027 (2005) (prohibiting
eminent domain “for the purpose of leisure amenities,” which is defined to include parks).
102. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 27.065 (2019–20) (discussing limits on a county’s ability to
acquire park property via eminent domain); 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1505/15 (West 2005)
(prohibiting eminent domain with respect to property located outside of the park district).
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administrators.103 In contrast, the standard process for park acquisition operates
without resort to eminent domain and thus outside this shadow of federal and
state law, leaving the functional role of lawmaking delegated to local
stakeholders. How these stakeholders navigate their unsung delegation informs
the very real-world outcome of where parkland is being acquired and placed in
localities across the United States today.
A. An Ecosystem of Permissive External Law
State law is the starting point for any assessment of local power.104 Of the
park agencies analyzed for this Article, nearly all operate under a state law
framework that permits or even encourages local parkland acquisition and does
so absent any explicit limitations in the enabling statute or constitutional
provision.105 These permissive state frameworks manifest in a number of ways.
Some legal schemes permit localities to obtain park property only in passing,
either as part of a larger grant that permits acquisitions for “public purposes” or
amidst a laundry list of other acquisition powers.106 Others are more explicit
103. Ruoying Chen, Invited Takings: Supermajority, Assembly Surplus, and Local Public
Financing, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2309, 2311 (2015).
104. Local governments are creatures of the states, see Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S.
161, 178 (1907), and even those buffeted by strong home rule powers must trace their authority
ultimately to state constitutional or statutory law. See generally Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State
Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 260–65 (2000).
See also Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 62, at 144 (“When used in the United States, the trope
[“creature of the state”] conveys the ability of the greater level of government to create, empower, and
abolish the local level.”).
105. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1545.11 (West 2020) (broad acquisition power for
metropark districts in Ohio); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-401 (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-494
(2020) (municipalities in Arizona); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5540 (West 2020) (certain special districts
in California); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5786.3 (West 2020) (other special districts in California); N.Y.
MUN. HOME RULE LAW 10 (McKinney 2021) (local governments in New York); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-18-18 (West 2021) (municipalities in New Mexico); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 331.001
(West 2005) (municipalities and counties in Texas); 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1505/15 (2014) (the
Chicago Park District in Illinois); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 755.12 (West 2020) (municipalities in
Ohio); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-1335 (West 2008) (cities in Kansas); 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 810/7
(2005) (forest preserves in Illinois); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 27.05 (2019–20) (counties in Wisconsin); N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 215 (McKinney 2022) (counties in New York); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-64-2 (West
2022) (municipalities and counties in Georgia).
106. In Texas, for example, “[a] municipality or county may improve land for park purposes,”
with the land being acquired by “gift, devise, purchase, or eminent domain proceeding.” TEX. LOC.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 331.001 (West 2005). This authority complements other acquisition powers
enjoyed by local governments under Texas law, including the power to acquire property in general, see
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.076 (West 2021), and acquire property in coordination with another
municipality, see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 273.001 (West 2016). The acquisition, ownership,
and management of park property is routinely seen as satisfying a public purpose requirement. See,
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and purposeful. In California, for example, cities and counties are not merely
empowered to acquire land for the preservation of open space,107 but they are
expressly encouraged to pursue property acquisitions that further this goal—
and to expend public funds in doing so.108 Meanwhile, counties in Wisconsin
and park districts in Ohio, among many others, are authorized not only to obtain
parkland within their jurisdiction, but also to acquire certain extraterritorial
parkland as well.109 And some enabling statutes go into considerable detail in
describing the park and park-adjacent uses that can fall within a local entity’s
acquisition ambit. Illinois law authorizes the Chicago Park District to acquire
land for driveways and boulevards; to obtain wharves, piers, jetties, and
airfields; and to construct field houses, stadiums, power plants, playgrounds,
and other improvements tied to the enjoyment of public parkland.110 Such
grants leave no doubt as to the local entity’s fundamental acquisition power. In
this environment, it is little surprise that local park administrators report
operating with few or no external legal constraints and rarely referencing state
law when pursuing property acquisition.111

e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 37351 (West 2019). See also Holder v. City of Yonkers, 56 N.Y.S. 912, 913
(App. Div. 1899) (“The acquirement of lands for purposes of a public park is a city purpose.”). See
also Mastrangelo v. State Council of Parks, 249 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 251 N.Y.S.2d 788
(1964) (“This does not, however, affect the City’s basic and constitutional right to acquire the property
for public use, to wit, park purposes.”).
107. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51097 (West 2019). In addition, other provisions of California
law make clear that local governments hold broad acquisition powers in general. See CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 37350 (West 2019); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 37351 (West 2019).
108. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6950 (West 2019); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6952 (West 2019); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 6953 (West 2019).
109. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 27.05 (West 2019–20) (permitting parkland acquisition within
three-quarters of a mile of the county line); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1545.11 (West 2020) (permitting
the entity to “acquire lands either within or without the park district”). See also City of Kirkwood v.
City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (discussing local power to acquire
extraterritorial parkland); City of Nashville v. Vaughn, 14 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tenn. 1929) (same); City
of Gainesville v. Pritchett, 199 S.E.2d 889, 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-642 (West 2022) (granting such power to counties and municipalities in Georgia); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1353 (West 2008) (granting such power to first-class cities in Kansas).
110. 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1505/15 (2014). See also In re Euclid Ave., 8 Ohio Dec. 86, 87
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 8, 1899) (finding that the board of park commissioners had “almost an
unlimited power and right to take, hold and control streets and public thoroughfares connecting and
leading to or from [] parks”).
111. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Stephanie Kutsko, supra note 18 (noting that the
agency’s state enabling statute is rarely referenced); Telephone Interview with Bill Maasen, supra note
3 (identifying the relevant state law as permissive); Telephone Interview with Robert Clemens, Land
Acquisition Manager, Lee Cnty. Parks & Recreation (July 15, 2021) (notes on file with author) (same);
Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37 (stating no knowledge of city or state law
that impedes acquisition).
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As a result of the deferential posture taken by state law, courts, too, have
long been permissive in their assessment of local acquisition power.112 Courts
have roundly endorsed acquisition activities, even in cases where the specific
power to acquire parks has not been expressly conferred by the legislature.113
They have defined the term “park” broadly, reasoning that ancillary public
purposes—i.e., acquiring land to operate a nursery that supplies park
resources—fall within the scope of parkland acquisition power.114 And perhaps
most helpfully for local governments, courts have also declined calls from
plaintiffs to narrow the scope of local power, citing state law provisions as
evidence of broad statutory intent, identifying where acquisition is mentioned
under state law, and noting the inherent public purpose of parkland creation
when faced with legislative silence.115 The location of new park property has
withstood collateral legal challenges, as well. While a number of lawsuits have
alleged racial discrimination in the distribution of local park facilities, these
claims have fared poorly, as courts have hesitated to question sublocal policy
choices absent a showing of intentional discrimination by local

112. See, e.g., Schweriner v. City of Philadelphia, 35 Pa. Super. 128, 130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1907)
(“The power of the city to acquire, lay out, improve and maintain ground for public parks cannot be
questioned.”); Bolick v. State, 95 Fla. 982 (Fla. 1928); Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 52 Colo.
15 (Colo. 1911); City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
City of Nashville v. Vaughn, 158 Tenn. 498 (Tenn. 1929) (upholding broad discretion to acquire
parkland); City of Hawthorne v. Peebles, 333 P.2d 442, 443 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (condemnation
for parkland can satisfy the requirement of “public necessity”); Thayer v. City of St. Joseph, 54 S.W.2d
442, 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
113. Holder v. City of Yonkers, 56 N.Y.S. 912, 913 (App. Div. 1899) (the power to acquire
property for public purposes includes the power to acquire parkland). The power to acquire parkland
has been articulated as a “basic and constitutional right” of a municipality due to the inherent public
use associated with park creation. See Mastrangelo v. State Council of Parks, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
114. See People ex rel. Sweitzer v. City of Chicago, 363 Ill. 409, 416 (1936) (“The power of the
city over parks is very broad. The city council has discretion over their size, location, number,
equipment, and maintenance.”). See also Dudley v. City of Charlotte, 27 S.E.2d 638 (N.C. 1943)
(power to acquire parks includes power to acquire a right-of-way for a street leading to a park); Laird
v. City of Pittsburg, 54 A. 324 (Pa. 1903) (permitting acquisition to construct library and art building
alongside park); Thayer, S.W.2d at 445 (property containing a swimming pool falls within the statutory
definition of “park”).
115. See, e.g., Baker v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., 33 N.E.3d 745, 753–54 (7th Cir. 2018)
(declining to limit a park district’s power to acquire property in “fee simple;” the court reasoned that
the limitation sought by plaintiffs was not contemplated by state law, which did not proscribe a
particular process for how a fee simple acquisition must proceed, and furthermore, even if the district
was engaging in a proprietary activity outside the explicit scope of the statute, it “did not acquire the
property for profit but rather for a public purpose.”) See also Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty. v. Mount
Greenwood Bank Land Tr. 5–0899, 579 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (“Here, the District’s
statutory power to acquire the subject property is not at issue, and the District’s interest in protecting
the property, for the benefit of the public, is free from doubt.”); supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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decisionmakers.116 Whether stated or not, judicial review of parkland
acquisition operates from the starting presumption that parks are normative
civic amenities, a presumption that casts a pall of permissiveness over the
sublocal policy choices that determine where and when a new park is created.117
Finally, at the municipal level, local charters and ordinances that speak to
acquisition generally mirror the permissive approach found in state law: they
operate to broadly encourage or permit parkland expansion.118 Local codes that
do not reference parkland acquisition, moreover, can also be read to sanction
acquisition power. When compared against the procedures placed upon public
land disposition, the specified and often onerous precepts of the latter stand in
sharp contrast with the permissive silence of the former.119 Ultimately local
116. See, e.g., Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State and
Local Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 357 nn.38–41
(2000). It should be noted, however, that cases from the Jim Crow era unsurprisingly did endorse
intentional racial discrimination in park acquisition. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Durham, 186 N.C. 421
(N.C. 1923).
117. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood, 589 S.W.2d at 42 (finding parks distinguishable from “high
offensive” uses such as the disposal facilities and incinerators and concluding that “[n]o specific
provision appears in [the statute] indicative of any intention on the part of the [legislature]” to limit
“the exercise of the power to acquire land for parks outside, but within one mile of the city limits”).
As a strong endorsement of local policymaking, a recent decision assessing local acquisition power
declined to question an “internal rule” of the local park agency in its acquisition process. See Baker,
33 N.E.3d at 756. See also Earth Management v. Heard County, 283 S.E.2d 455, 459 (Ga. 1981) (“[A]
public park is a public purpose and . . . the court is in no position to second guess [a] county as to the
size and scope of a park for its people.”); Thayer, S.W.2d at 445 (finding that “the word ‘park’ when
used in a legal sense has rather a broad meaning”).
118. See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 381 (granting broad authorization for New
York City to acquire property); WESTCHESTER CNTY., NY., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 249.31(1) (1961)
(providing that the local park agency “may” consider parkland acquisition, “may” make option
agreements, and “may” negotiate for the purchase of a fee simple or lesser estate); BAKERSFIELD, CA.,
MUN. CODE § 15.80.030 (1995) (granting the “authority to locate [or] require . . . dedication of real
property . . . for the purpose of supplying public parks”). See also Telephone Interview with Bonnie
Diaz, supra note 28 (discussing how an amendment to the County Charter restricts public land
disposition but not acquisition); Telephone Interview with Glenn Boorman, supra note 11 (noting lack
of legal constraints); Telephone Interview with Paul Sun, supra note 15 (same); Telephone Interview
with Allen Ishibashi, supra note 17 (same); Telephone Interview with Robert Clemens, supra note 111
(same).
119. Under the Philadelphia Municipal Code, for example, a number of provisions establish
procedural and substantive requirements for public land disposition, including a provision that speaks
directly to parkland disposition. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., MUN. CODE §§ 16-403, 15-102. See also
Philadelphia
City
Council,
Bill
No.
190606-AA
(Nov.
12,
2019),
http://www.amlegal.com/pdffiles/Philadelphia/190606-AA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9PC-YQS9]
(establishing “uniform procedures for the disposition of property by the City and City-related
agencies”). Meanwhile, the Municipal Code contains only spare references to public land acquisition
and no mention of parkland acquisition; these provisions are bare and permissive in tone. See
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legislatures appear to share the default presumption held by courts: that park
acquisition is an unconditional civic virtue. Few adopt ordinances that address
and directly impact a park agency’s geographic discretion.120
More so than at the state level, however, municipal law does at times
impose procedural structure upon the acquisition process.121 A park agency
may be required to request legislative approval for some or all of its property
acquisitions.122 Similarly, an agency may find it politically valuable or
expedient to bring certain acquisitions for legislative approval, even absent a
defined mandate to do so.123 Other laws may seek appraisals or maps of
proposed acquisitions.124 The hurdles posed by these procedures are often
minimal or perfunctory in practice, though.125 In Nashville, for example, the
Board of Parks and Recreation is required by charter to seek approval from a
local legislative body, the Metropolitan Council, when acquiring parkland by

PHILADELPHIA, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 16-101 (permitting acquisition to construct new facilities);
Id. § 16-102 (permitting acquisition at sheriffs’ sales); Id. § 19-1602 (discussing water and sewer
charges on acquired properties). The Code’s most substantive acquisition requirements are reserved
only for tax-delinquent properties acquired by the Philadelphia Land Bank. See id. § 16-705(3).
120. Of the agencies studied for this Article, there were a few cases where acquisition criteria or
priorities were set by external law rather than internal policy. See, e.g., Resolution 2018-41, Collier
Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs (Feb. 27, 2018) (on file with author) (setting criteria by ordinance in
Collier County); Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Cnty. Atty., to Miami-Dade Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs
(Oct. 16, 2012) (on file with author) (discussing a resolution that encourages the Park, Recreation, and
Open Space Department in Miami to consider vacant parcels adjacent to parkland for acquisition).
121. State law often poses no distinct procedural requirements upon local governments, which
often are not subject to state administrative procedure acts. See generally Adams, supra note 73;
Davidson, supra note 54, at 605. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.045 (West 2021) (requiring that
municipalities seeking to acquire property maintain written records of every appraisal, offer, and
counteroffer).
122. See, e.g., ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5-2-5(A) (2016) (subjecting
some property acquisitions by the city to approval by the City Council, but not where the Council has
previously appropriated money for acquisition); Atlanta Dept. of Parks and Recreation, supra note 37,
at 9; Miami-Dade Response, supra note 79 (providing an operations manual regarding acquisition
procedures); Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28 (discussing this process).
123. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Kutsko, supra note 18 (noting that Cleveland
Metroparks may seek approval from its board for higher-profile acquisitions, and likewise may
approach a local municipality for approval when pursuing a high-profile acquisition that falls within
the municipality’s jurisdiction).
124. See, e.g., WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 249.41 (1961) (requiring
that the agency prepare a map of any properties proposed for acquisition).
125. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28 (noting that County Council
approval has not been an issue). But see Telephone Interview with Kelly Grissman, supra note 16
(discussing procedural hurdles that add cost and time to the acquisition process).
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gift or condemnation,126 a mandate that could in theory infuse the Metropolitan
Council with sweeping acquisition oversight. Yet the requirement has been
chipped away in court, where it was found to create a non-exclusive path to
acquisition that does not apply to the purchase of real estate.127 It has been
chipped away further in practice, where it appears the Metropolitan Council
serves as a final step in the acquisition process with respect only to certain
properties.128
In sum, when considering the external legal regime that frames and
shadows the world of local parkland, the overwhelming takeaway is that
acquisition power is broad and clear, even if passively granted.129 And
crucially, with only rare exceptions, external actors generally do not dictate
where a local parks administrator should locate new parkland, or similarly, what
policy considerations should play into these decisions.130 The geography of
park acquisition is instead delegated almost fully to the sublocal level.
Permissive local power is perhaps unsurprising in the realm of parkland
acquisition. The process of growing an entity’s park inventory does not straddle
political fault lines or implicate concerns of good governance.131 Moreover, the
geography of local park placement and access falls traditionally within the
ambit of land use planning, a function viewed as quintessentially within a local
government’s purview.132 States therefore hesitate to limit or mandate

126. See CHARTER OF THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON
COUNTY, TN., § 11.1002(5). On the role of charters in local government law, see Nestor M. Davidson,
Local Constitutions, 99 TEX. L. REV. 839 (2021).
127. See Zseltvay v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 01A-01-9605-CV-00201,
1996 WL 596951, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1996).
128. See E-Mail from Cindy Harrison, Assistant Dir. Metro Parks, Nashville Parks and
Recreation Bd. (Feb. 12, 2021) (on file with author) (providing acquisition policies that note approval
requests are sent to the Metropolitan Council “if applicable”).
129. The hands-off legislative approach to local parkland acquisition does not necessarily
indicate that states have no stake in local greenspace creation. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 380 n.35
(noting state efforts to promote urban park creation).
130. As a notable exception, see infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the Santa
Clara Open Space Authority). The legislative decision to prescribe geographic priorities in the Open
Space Authority’s enabling statute underscores the silence of similar California statutes that do not.
131. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
132. See Colin Crawford, Environmental Benefits and the Notion of Positive Environmental
Justice, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 911, 911 (2011); Charles Gottlieb, Regional Land Use Planning: A
Collaborative Solution for the Conservation of Natural Resources, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35, 36
(2014); Richard Briffault, “What About the “Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1318 n.57 (1994) (regarding land use regulation).
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greenspace creation.133 In many respects, indeed, considering that broad and
discretionary local power is a norm in local government,134 state abstention on
the issue is unexceptional; it provides little guidance as to how legislatures view
the competing policy aims of local parkland geography. Their permissive
delegation can be seen as alternatively purposeful or inattentive. But in either
case, it remains for the local authorities who receive this delegation to mold it
into policy.
B. Exceptions to Permissive External Law
To be sure, discussions of local government power are prone to
generalizations. When considering the tens of thousands of local entities that
operate in the United States, one will find that exceptions and other cracks
emerge in the baseline model.135 Here, too, it should be noted that some local
park agencies do not enjoy the same acquisition latitude as their peers. Some
limits on acquisition power are fairly minimal and procedural.136 But some are
more substantive. Most notably, the enabling statutes of several special purpose
park agencies contain language that directly reduces the geographic discretion
of local officials. In California, for instance, the Santa Clara Open Space
Authority is required to prioritize park acquisition on “those lands closest, most
accessible, and visible to the urban area.”137 In Minnesota, meanwhile, state
law obliges the Three Rivers Park District to obtain consent of the local
municipality before acquiring property in its jurisdiction.138

133. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 381 (“Mandate-based regulation, such as state or federal
regulation requiring green space preservation or creation, would likely be politically unpalatable and
ineffective.”).
134. See Briffault, supra note 132, at 1318 (“Many local governments enjoy substantial
autonomy with respect to many matters. . . . Although local power is, at its source, a delegation from
a state, that delegation is often quite broad and is rarely revoked. In most states, local governments
operate in major policy areas without significant external legislative, administrative, or judicial
supervision.”).
135. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 58, at 36–7 (noting the “institutional diversity” at the local
and sublocal levels that make broad-stroke generalizations difficult). According to 2017 census
figures, there are over 90,000 general and special purpose local governments in the United States. 2017
Census
of
Governments,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html [https://perma.cc/Q8YZSZFG].
136. An example seen in several states is the requirement to get the property appraised prior to
purchase. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-10-4-25(h) (West 2022) (requiring appraisals in certain
cases); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.045 (West 2021) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.275 (West
2015) (regarding county acquisitions).
137. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35152(b) (West 2019).
138. MINN. STAT. § 398.09(b)(1) (2021).
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These examples appear relatively rare. More common, however, are the
indirect and secondary legal impediments that implicate local parkland
acquisition power. Despite generally enjoying broad and permissive external
powers to acquire park properties, indirect limitations on local power and
informal checks on local governance can still constrain how and where local
administrators obtain properties for parks purposes. For example, some local
governments are tasked with adopting comprehensive plans—including, at
times, plans that specifically include a parks component.139 Local officials are
given discretion in molding the substance of a comprehensive plan and the final
product is treated with considerable deference by courts.140 Still, these
documents could functionally nudge local actors; being required to have a plan,
as a matter of process, may force pre-commitments today that shape decisions
down the road.
A couple other secondary impediments are worth noting. First, state
governments wield appreciable structural power over local park agencies.
Special purpose park authorities are generally created by state statute, and
therefore are subject to ultimate state legislative control,141 while state law also
prescribes the selection process for officials at some city and county parks
departments.142 Structural state power manifests itself in a number of indirect
ways, perhaps none more prominent than the power exercised by states over the
purse strings of local governance. Local entities operate in an environment of
fiscal scarcity,143 and parkland acquisition is not immune from budgetary
pressures; perceived as a dispensable component of municipal budgets,144 park
investment has historically risen and fallen with the economic climate, as
localities boost their spending when tax receipts are strong and cut those

139. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 394.25(2) (2021) (under certain circumstances a county must adopt
a parks and open space plan); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-16-2324(3)(b) (West 2021) (a county must
prepare a comprehensive open space plan prior to selling, leasing, or exchanging park property); FLA.
ADMIN. CODE r. 9J-5.006 (2022) (requiring recreation and open space standards in local
comprehensive plans).
140. See Crowley v. City of Hood River, 480 P.3d 1007, 1011 (Or. Ct. App. 2020) (noting the
“highly deferential” standard of review granted localities when considering a local comprehensive
plan).
141. See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1831 (2002).
142. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 27.03(2) (West 2019–20) (discussing the appointment of a
county park system’s general manager).
143. See generally Aurelia Chaudhur, Adam J. Levine & David Schleicher, Junk Cities:
Resolving Insolvency Crises in Overlapping Municipalities, 107 CAL. L. REV. 459, 465 (2019).
144. See Parks and the Pandemic, supra note 43, at 9 (discussing a 2017 survey of city managers
and mayors that found these officials view park and recreation spending as nonessential in local
budgets).
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expenditures when they are not.145 The sources of funding they draw upon are
often regulated by state statute. State law controls a local government’s ability
to raise sales tax or demand exactions from developers, for example.146 It
determines whether, and how, revenues are shared with local governments.147
As a consequence, grant programs funded and administered at the state level
serve as important sources of local acquisition funding—and also, at times, an
opportunity for state actors to signal their conservation values to localities.148
The cyclical nature of local park finance could tip the scales of parkland
acquisition policy, pushing local administrators to prioritize those acquisitions
that secure grant support or demand fewer resources. Properties could be
acquired that pose fewer costs upfront—at the most economical, a property
being offered by donation—or fewer costs down the road, perhaps by seeking
parcels with fewer maintenance needs or accompanied by dedicated
maintenance funding.149 To a degree these considerations are elemental to the
parkland acquisition process.150 Perhaps surprisingly, though, they are not allencompassing. Despite operating in a resource-limited environment, the
average local park agency still has funds set aside for land acquisition.151 Some
have created a line item for acquisition in their budgets, whereas others have
145. See Nicholas Pitas, Austin Barrett, Andrew Mowen & Kevin Roth, The Great Recession’s
Profound Impact on Parks and Recreation, NAT’L RECREATION AND PARK ASS’N (Feb. 2018),
https://www.nrpa.org/parks-recreation-magazine/2018/february/the-great-recessions-profoundimpact-on-parks-and-recreation/ [https://perma.cc/R9JB-GSE8].
146. E.g., Jeff Chapman, Local Tax Limitations Can Hamper Fiscal Stability of Cities and
Counties, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 8, 2021), https://origin.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2021/07/statetaxlimitations_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS87-NHK8] (regarding state
limits on local tax power); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66477 (West 2021) (delineating a scheme for cities
and counties in California to impose exactions).
147. See generally Amanda Kass, Michael Pagano & Farhad Kaab Omeyr, How States Provide
Cities with General Revenue: An Analysis of Unrestricted State Aid, (LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y,
Working Paper No. WP20AK1, 2020), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/kass_
wp20ak1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH3K-FP38] (analyzing state disbursement to local governments).
148. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 259.105 (West 2021) (the “Florida Forever Act”) (creating a
notable state-funded conservation acquisition program; funding received under the program is subject
to priorities and procedures set forth under the Act).
149. See, e.g., E-mail from Tom Korosei, supra note 16 (discussing considerations that inform
when the Department accepts parkland donations); see supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Rizzardi, supra note 11, at 28–42 (tracing the impact of funding constraints
on local governance); Garnett, supra note 58, at 43 (noting that resources play a role in the focus and
scope of sublocal governance).
151. See 2021 NRPA Agency Performance Review, NAT’L RECREATION AND PARKS ASS’N 23–
25 (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.nrpa.org/siteassets/2021-agency-performance-review_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EVL-RVZ8] (reporting survey results indicating that agencies have a median of $6
million budgeted for capital expenditures, of which, on average, 32% of this amount is budgeted for
new development and 8% for acquisition).
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not, yet still hold flexibility to find acquisition funds when desired.152 No doubt
considerable variation exists between local jurisdictions.153
Agencies
nevertheless share one universal commonality: a constituency that is broadly
supportive of park expansion.154 Their acquisition funding often traces to voterapproved initiatives, which stand as dedicated insurance policies against the
shifting political and economic winds to which local general funds are
subject.155 The strength of voter support may explain why park agencies
purchase a significant number of the fee simple properties they obtain.156
As an additional secondary impediment of note, park agencies also acquire
property through specific acquisition programs authorized under state and local
law, the most notable among these being parkland dedication ordinances. A
dedication ordinance requires private developers to contribute greenspace
property—or alternatively, pay an in-lieu fee—when seeking to construct

152. See Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37 (noting an acquisition
budget); 2017 Parks and Open Space Plan, SEATTLE PARKS & RECREATION 2 (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/ParksAndRecreation/PoliciesPlanning/2017Plan/20
17ParksandOpenSpacePlanFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYP4-ZG8E] (discussing a $2 million annual
acquisition budget); Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28 (noting that acquisition
funds can be secured when sought, yet are not isolated on the agency’s budget).
153. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Bill Maasen, supra note 3 (explaining that the agency
is well-funded).
154. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Denver Parks & Recreation, Draft Strategic Acquisition Plan 1–2 (Apr. 2021) (on
file with author) (discussing the voter-approved sales tax that supports park expansion in Denver);
2017 Parks and Open Space Plan, supra note 152, at 2 (discussing the voter-approved tax supporting
acquisition in Seattle); Operations Manual, supra note 80, at 1 (providing an operations manual that
discusses a voter-approved millage supporting acquisition efforts in Miami); Oklahoma City Parks
Master
Plan,
OKLA.
CITY
PARKS
&
RECREATION
DEPT.
17
(2020),
https://www.okc.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/20965/637456235265330000
[https://perma.cc/ERV8-98ZL] (describing a voter-approved bond to support, in part, parkland
acquisition in Oklahoma City); Memorandum from the Conservation and Environmental Lands
Management Department, Hillsborough Cnty., to the Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Hillsborough Cnty. (Apr.
2018) (on file with author) (discussing a voter-approved acquisition program in Hillsborough County);
Conservation
20/20,
LEE CNTY., FL.
https://www.leegov.com/parks/conservation2020
[https://perma.cc/7XTL-D6E8] (noting that Lee County’s Conservation 20/20 program was renewed
in 2016 with 84% of voters in support).
156. When park agencies shared per-property acquisition methods in response to this Article’s
public records requests, their data indicated a strong reliance on fee simple purchases alongside
donations and other less costly acquisition approaches. In Indianapolis, for example, the Parks &
Recreation Department has acquired twenty-five properties by purchase since 2010, as compared with
ten properties acquired via donation and the twenty-four obtained through intergovernmental transfers
or other means. See Response to Public Records Request from City of Indianapolis to Wendy Xu,
Univ. of Detroit Mercy Sch. of L. (Mar. 31, 2021) (on file with author) (providing a list of park property
acquisitions).
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certain housing projects in a community.157 Plainly, dedication programs serve
as assets to park agencies: they offer an opportunity to create new greenspace
with land or funding an agency would not have otherwise possessed.158 Yet as
with the fiscal constraints discussed above, these programs can also influence
where an agency acquires property. When resources are limited—due to budget
pressures, staff bandwidth, or both—programs that offer an acquisition pipeline
with a dedicated process and funding source offer an evident appeal,
functionally reducing the number of acquisitions pursued outside of its
strictures.159 Arguably, then, dedication and other acquisition programs can
prod park administrators in a manner that narrows their discretion and thus
power.160
But as a matter of law, these acquisition programs still do not proscribe or
guide an agency’s core acquisition power.161 The trend, in fact, is to structure
acquisition programs so as to enhance agency discretion; local governments
have embraced dedication programs that emphasize the collection of in-lieu
fees over property dedications, an approach that leaves ultimate geographic
decision-making with park agencies.162 As a matter of practice, moreover, an

157. See, e.g., KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEV. CODE § 88-408; John L. Crompton, An
Analysis of Parkland Dedication Ordinances in Texas, 28 J. PARK AND RECREATION ADMIN. 70, 74
(2010). Under some dedication programs, the new park site may remain owned by the developer or
another private entity. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TX., UNIFIED DEV. CODE § 35-503(g)
158. See, e.g., Oklahoma City Parks Master Plan, supra note 155, at 82 (listing cities that have
adopted dedication ordinances and noting the amounts generated from dedication fees in Oklahoma
City in 2019).
159. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
160. While dedication programs are the most prevalent example, they are not the only
nonexclusive acquisition programs that may influence the acquisition decision of local park agencies.
See, e.g., Resol. 2004-80, supra note 37 (setting forth the Volusia Forever Program).
161. See, e.g., id. (“These procedures apply to selection and purchase of land under the Volusia
Forever Program, and shall not apply to property acquisitions completed by Volusia County for other
purposes or using other funding sources.”).
162. See Telephone Interview with Paul Sun, supra note 15 (noting a decline in use of dedication
acquisitions over time and a switch from property dedications to in-lieu fees). See also BAKERSFIELD,
CA., MUN. CODE, supra note 118; ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 19-1007(a) (2021)
(providing for in-lieu fees); Dedication and Development Criteria Manual, AURORA PARKS,
RECREATION
&
OPEN
SPACE
DEPT.
6
(Oct.
2020),
https://p1cdn4static.civiclive.com/UserFiles/Servers/Server_1881137/File/Departments/PROS/PDC/
2020%20PROS%20D&DC%20MANUAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8X9-KSAD] (providing for in-lieu
fees at the city’s discretion). Some dedication programs do require that in-lieu fees are spent within
the section of the park agency’s where they were collected. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Rosalie
Hendon, supra note 37. Here too, however, there has been a recent effort to loosen these restrictions
and broaden the geographic reach of dedication fees. See id. CA. ASSEMBLY REG. SESS. 2013, Bill
No. 1359(a)(3)(B) (expanding the use of impact fees to permit parks in a different neighborhood from
where the fee was collected).
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acquisition program’s more rigid structure also impedes its applicability.163
Agencies still pursue and consummate significant numbers of acquisitions in
practice outside of any programmatic framework.164
This survey of structural and programmatic constraints suggests a couple
shared takeaways. On the one hand, secondary legal impediments do exist in
the park ecosystem, and these impediments likely do impact the parkland
acquisition process. Local parks are not created in a vacuum. On the other
hand, however, fiscal concerns and dedication ordinances are not the end of the
story. Park agencies expend significant resources to purchase new park
properties, notwithstanding the environmental pressures at play.165 When
distilled to its barest form, the legal regime of park acquisition is ultimately still
a permissive, discretionary, and unconstrained one.166 Local administrators
might be nudged by outside forces—yet only rarely are they mandated or
compelled to act by them.
C. The Outcome: Delegation to the Lowest Level of Governance
With external law largely silent or permissive, our analysis of parkland
acquisition must dive further down the chain of government power, turning now
to local park agencies themselves and to the legal regime created internally by
these institutions rather than mandated by external actors. How is this legal
regime created, contested, and applied? The question demands an appraisal of
the sublocal stakeholders and internal rules that fill the external governance
void and mold a heterogeneous system of parkland acquisition.
Internal acquisition law at the sublocal level comes in two primary written
forms: planning documents, which can establish acquisition priorities even if
they serve primarily as aspirational vision statements, and internal policy
documents, including acquisition checklists and operations manuals, which can

163. See Volusia Cnty., Contract to Purchase Property from Lemon Bluff R.V. Park and Fish
Camp 04-1 (Dec. 20, 2012) (on file with author) (noting that the County “was not able to negotiate a
purchase through the Volusia Forever process,” and therefore was instead acquiring the property via a
purchase contract outside any formal program); Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note
37 (noting the limits and constrictions of the local dedication ordinance).
164. See Peter Harnik & Luara Yaffe, Who’s Going to Pay for This Park?, THE TR. FOR
PUB. LAND, https://www.tpl.org/sites/default/files/cloud.tpl.org/pubs/ccpe_who_is_going_to_pay.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3CK-L9KA] (assessing the limits of dedication programs).
165. Id.
166. Telephone Interview with Glenn Boorman, supra note 11 (observing that while fiscal
constraints exist, local administrators hold discretion to set priorities within the parameters of those
limitations).
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inform an agency’s on-the-ground actions.167 The city of Columbus, Ohio
offers an example of the interplay between these two sources of sublocal
governance. First, Columbus has a comprehensive planning document— the
Columbus Recreation & Parks Land Plan—that specifically focuses on land
acquisition planning through the year 2024.168 The plan provides an overview
of parkland location and access in Columbus while offering some broad
recommendations for new park priorities.169 Notably, it encourages the
Columbus Recreation and Parks Department (CRPD) to focus on acquisitions
that provide greenspace to underserved communities or address gaps in the
existing parks and trail system.170 The Land Plan thus establishes a global,
high-level vision to guide the work of CRPD employees.171
But it offers no operative rubric for approaching acquisition on a parcel-byparcel basis,172 a task that falls to the city’s other primary source of internal
guidance: an acquisition checklist that sets forth criteria to gauge, necessary
costs to estimate, and other pertinent data to compile and document when the
CRPD is considering a new purchase or donation.173 Some of the criteria mirror

167. Of the fifty park agencies whose acquisitions were mapped and analyzed for this Article,
thirty-nine have some form of planning or vision document that discusses acquisition. A smaller yet
appreciable number also written internal policy documents, either voluntarily or in response to public
records requests, most notably acquisition checklists. See, e.g., E-mail from Roque Duque De Estrada,
San Antonio Parks and Recreation Dept. (Feb. 24, 2021) (on file with author) (sharing “an informal
parkland criteria checklist”); Portland Parks & Recreation, Land Acquisition Strategy (2016) (on file
with author); Response to Public Records Request from City of Indianapolis, supra note 156 (providing
a property acquisition evaluation form). Of course, this summary generalizes the universe of internal
acquisition documents and does not capture the approach taken by every agency. See E-mail from
Brenda Sandburg, Real Estate Mgmt. Supervisor, Montgomery Cnty. Parks (May 3, 2021) (stating that
“we don’t have a single policy document, but a complex web of adopted policies, procedures, and
recommendations that drives how we prioritize to acquire parkland to meet the needs of a growing
county”).
168. See Columbus Recreation and Parks, Land Plan 2019–2024 4 (Aug. 2019) (on file with
author).
169. Id. at 17, 26.
170. See id. at 18–19, 26, 34.
171. See Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37 (describing the Land Plan as
a vision document).
172. The Land Plan identifies properties of interest, see, e.g., Columbus Recreation and Parks,
supra note 168, at 34–35, but does not delineate which are available for purchase or donation, how to
allocate limited funding, or how to weigh different considerations and concerns in the acquisition
process. Stated otherwise, the plan offers priorities and guidance at the city-wide level but not at the
per-parcel one.
173. Columbus Recreation and Parks, Acquisition Checklist (Feb. 26, 2019) (on file with
author). See also Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37 (describing the checklist
as the operative internal document referenced during the acquisition process).
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the priorities found in the Land Plan.174 Others are more operative in nature
and allow for more focused, parcel-by-parcel assessments.175 In this manner,
the checklist adds a layer of specificity atop the Land Plan and hones its focus.
Yet our illustration of the CRPD is not yet complete; a third source of internal
law now comes into play. The acquisition checklist does not prompt agency
employees to consider a parcel’s potential drawbacks, such as concerns about
community opposition or environment contamination.176 Instead, it is the task
of these employees to bring their institutional knowledge to bear and keep their
experience with past pitfalls in mind when assessing a property.177
While Columbus’s hybrid internal regime is not representative of all
agencies, the example begins to illustrate the central role played by sublocal
stakeholders in park lawmaking. The most important lawmakers in the
acquisition realm are park agency employees, the civil servants within parks
departments and park authorities who manage real estate, planning, and
administration in local park systems large and small across the country. With
external sources of authority providing mostly bare direction and only indirect
limitations, it falls first and foremost to these individuals, people who sit at the
lowest, but often most impactful level of governance, to mold an operative legal
regime of local parkland acquisition.178
Bureaucrats within sublocal
179
government in general —and within park agencies, as well180—represent the
frontline foot soldiers of day-to-day governance.
The discretion they exercise is considerable. In the absence of restrictive
external law, parkland acquisition is guided by the internal park agency policies
and planning documents that employees charged with overseeing the process

174. See, e.g., Columbus Recreation and Parks, supra note 173 (asking whether the acquisition
“[s]erves previously unserved Columbus residents”).
175. See, e.g., id. (asking whether the property is easily accessible from the public right-of-way
and how many people it serves within a ten-minute walk). The checklist allows for direct comparisons
between parcels, as agency staff can quickly ascertain which of two potential acquisitions satisfies
more criteria, serves more people, or expects to carry lower operating costs, among other
considerations.
176. See Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37 (describing such drawbacks
as drawn from staff experience).
177. See id.
178. When power is devolved to and within administrative institutions, individuals can hold
significant discretion to implement policy, set priorities, or delegate power further. See Nou, supra
note 19, at 451–52, 468–71 (examining federal agencies).
179. See Davidson, supra note 54, at 606.
180. See Davis, supra note 24, at 138 (discussing the discretion held by staff in local public land
management).
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are responsible for writing or interpreting—or both.181 The result in many cases
is an acquisition framework closely tied to the people administering it. At the
most informal end of the spectrum, an employee who manages park acquisition
creates a policy document for herself or himself to use when purchasing
property or deciding when to accept a donation.182 That document might never
be viewed by anyone outside the agency, let alone interpreted by a court, and it
might never again be referenced after its author leaves their position. Internal
policies at other agencies are more formal and longstanding.183 But here, too,
the employees tasked with property acquisition hold significant discretion in
practice. They can elect to follow the established policy as a matter of habit,
consistency, or because they determine it has proved effective in the past.184
Conversely, however, because their internal policy is not mandated by outside
forces, park agency employees can choose to disregard or selectively apply it,
leaning instead on the personal expertise they have accumulated from prior land
acquisitions.185 The expertise these employees bring to bear can functionally
supersede a written policy, demonstrating that institutional knowledge operates
as a discrete source and situs of local acquisition lawmaking.186
But agency employees do not operate in a vacuum. In addition to serving
as repositories of accumulated expertise, frontline local employees also act as
181. See e.g., Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28; see St. Louis County Dept.
of Parks and Recreation, supra note 94; infra note 182.
182. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Bonnie Diaz, supra note 28. Before Ms. Diaz joined
St. Louis County, the parks department lacked a dedicated staff member responsible for acquisition
and had no formal or informal internal policy on the books. Consequently, Ms. Diaz has created for
herself a procedure for inbounding new parkland donations, which is the primary way the County
obtains new park properties. See St. Louis County Dept. of Parks and Recreation, supra note 94.
183. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (regarding Miami-Dade); infra notes 204–
10 (regarding Atlanta and Cook County).
184. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Paul Sun, supra note 15. Agency staff use a criteria
matrix to assess potential property acquisitions, not because it is mandated by law but rather as a matter
of habit and to promote transparency in their process. See also Telephone Interview with Rosalie
Hendon, supra note 37 (discussing the creation and use of an acquisition checklist as a form of
historical recordkeeping; when an employee involved in a given acquisition is no longer working at
the agency, the checklist can help cover gaps in the institutional knowledge of those who remain).
185. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Allen Ishibashi, supra note 17. The agency has a land
acquisition policy from 1988; while it reflects current practices, it is rarely referenced because staff
have discretion to rely on their intuition and expertise in assessing a potential acquisition. See also
supra note 117 (discussing Baker v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., 33 N.E.3d 745, 756 (7th Cir.
2018).
186. See Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37 (discussing the institutional
knowledge of long-tenured agency employees and their overlay of such knowledge upon the written
plans and checklists that guide parkland acquisition); Telephone Interview with Robert Clemens, supra
note 111 (noting that unwritten acquisition criteria are prioritized and balanced pursuant to the
institutional knowledge held by agency staff).
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mediators—as conduits of local knowledge among and between other
stakeholders in the community.187 The line between public participation and
local agency governance is often a very fine one.188 When a sublocal park
employee makes an acquisition decision, they might be deferring to the position
of an angry community member, weighing interests of governmental or
nongovernmental partners, or responding to knowledge gleaned from a
landowner whose property borders an existing park.189 Because these
employees sit at the lowest rung of local government, they also find themselves
closest to the people. The lawmaking authority they enjoy is subject to being
informed or influenced—or captured—by other local stakeholders who choose
to participate in the process.190
The universe of potential outside stakeholders is vast. Consultants and
nonprofit organizations write acquisition plans, provide funding, and conduct
gap analysis studies of parkland needs.191 Contractors and local real estate
brokers spot for-sale signs when an undeveloped property goes on the
market.192 Counterparts at other local park agencies reach out to coordinate on
policy, request maintenance support for a new acquisition, and propose a sale

187. See Davidson, supra note 54, at 574; Lavoie, supra note 68, at 649–50; Davidson &
Fagundes, supra note 53, at 820 (regarding “mediating disputes”); Noah M. Kazis, Transportation,
Land Use, and the Sources of Hyper-Localism, 106 IOWA L. REV. 2339, 2340 (2021) (describing a
common conversation at community meetings where “elected officials and community members swap
helpful announcements”).
188. Davidson, supra note 54, at 572 (noting that “[l]ocal agencies also often operate at the edge
of a blurry line between governmental action and public participation”).
189. See id. at 618 (citing Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 887–93 (1983)). See also Telephone Interview
with Allen Ishibashi, supra note 17 (discussing interactions with park neighbors).
190. See Davidson & Fagundes, supra note 53, at 812–13. Legal scholars have debated the true
value of participation in the local and sublocal governance process. Some argue that participation is
fundamental to sublocal administration. Compare Noah M. Kazis, American Unicameralism: The
Structure of Local Legislatures, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1207 (2018) (demonstrating participation as
fundamental in the local administrative process, particularly when compared against the local
legislative one) with Shoked, supra note 62, at 1379 (critiquing “administrative micro-localism” where
participation is more symbolic than political); Crowder, supra note 71, at 625 (discussing the façade
of informal participation and advocating for more formal structures at the community level).
191. On the role of consultants in local governance, see Samuel T. Bassett, Consultants, Urban
Leadership, and the Replica City 12–14 (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago),
https://indigo.uic.edu/ndownloader/files/19374707 [https://perma.cc/9N9A-FFRD].
192. See Telephone Interview with Paul Sun, supra note 15 (mentioning being approached by
owners, neighbors, real estate agents, developers, and attorneys); Telephone Interview with Allen
Ishibashi, supra note 17 (mentioning park rangers spotting for-sale signs).
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or exchange of parkland presently under the outside agency’s ownership.193
And finally, of course, residents of the local community participate in the
acquisition process too. Private landowners approach park agencies to propose
donations.194 Neighbors speak up to advocate for a parkland acquisition—or
against one.195 And community groups, businesses, and conservation advocates
also have a voice to add to the chorus.196
With such a broad field of potential participants, the ability for a stakeholder
to impact parkland acquisition will turn on the relative strength of their voice
within the sublocal ecosystem. One could imagine a number of hierarchical
permutations between these stakeholders, each permutation yielding a different
governance outcome. Where neighbors hold disproportionate voice in the
acquisition process, for example, their personal interests may outweigh civic
ones, marginalizing the voices of residents who live further from existing
parks.197 Where consultants and intergovernmental partners drive the
conversation, an ethos of administrative efficiency may prevail, yet in the
process dampening the interactive strength of sublocal governance and
overlooking the unique needs of the local community.198 Giving voice to
community groups may address some of these concerns, but doing so also raises
the risk that decision-making will grow ad hoc and opaque as a result.199
Community groups, after all, are not an undifferentiated mass. Rather they are

193. See Telephone Interview with Clement Lau, supra note 17 (regarding policy coordination);
Telephone Interview with Rosalie Hendon, supra note 37 (regarding maintenance coordination);
Telephone Interview with Stephanie Kutsko, supra note 18 (regarding maintenance and exchanges).
194. Some agencies use donations as their primary acquisition vehicle. See supra note 16
(discussing Anchorage); supra note 182 (discussing St. Louis County).
195. Neighbors play a role in the acquisition process, whether through formal or informal
channels. See Telephone Interview with Kelly Grissman, supra note 16 (explaining that agency staff
get coffee and build relationships with surrounding owners); Columbus Recreation and Parks,
Acquisition Closing Checklist (Feb. 26, 2019) (on file with author) (requiring that staff “Notify
Adjacent Property Owners”). Despite the public’s broad support for parkland creation, see supra notes
49–52 and accompanying text, there are examples, too, of local landowners opposing a proposed
acquisition. See Telephone Interview with Allen Ishibashi, supra note 17 (discussing opposition in
San Mateo County).
196. See Telephone Interview with Allen Ishibashi, supra note 17.
197. See Shoked, supra note 62, at 1380–83 (arguing that sublocal participation must “transcend
private interests” and avoid homogeneity); Kazis, supra note 187, at 2349–41 (discussing the outsized
control held by neighbors over the land use process).
198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (regarding local government bureaucrats are
technocratic managers); supra note 66 and accompanying text (on the value of sublocal governance);
see generally K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control,
108 CALIF. L. REV. 679 (2020) (discussing the structures of exclusion that impede community
participation, even at the informal local and sublocal levels).
199. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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apt to represent a cross-section of formal and informal neighborhood
institutions, the most powerful of which do not necessarily speak for wide
swaths of the constituency.200 Too much community participation can also
overwhelm an agency’s acquisition resources.201
The task of a local park agency is to adjudicate between these voices,
forging a recipe that yields normative policy outcomes.202 This is a fine line to
walk. How, then, is it navigated? How is it determined which stakeholders
have the loudest and most impactful voice in the crowded, yet thinly defined
landscape of local park acquisition?
An initial answer to the question hearkens back to the competing values of
informality and proactivity in sublocal governance. The more formal a park
agency’s internal acquisition regime, the more disparate community voices can
theoretically be brought into the process.203 A few examples are illustrative.
Towards the most formal end of the spectrum, Atlanta’s Department of Parks
and Recreation has a written procedure for promoting broad participation in
determining where to acquire new greenspace.204 The procedure encourages a
wide variety of entities—ranging from governmental partners to nonprofits to
community groups—to advocate for a parkland acquisition by completing and
submitting a template questionnaire to the Department.205 Submitted
questionnaires are then shared with members of the Green Team, a working
group represented by local agencies and advised by community partners, which
assesses the proposal in light of a number of express criteria—including
consideration of whether the community supports the acquisition.206 In a
parallel process, Department staff are also provided the questionnaire for
purposes of conducting a site visit and preparing an evaluation of the

200. See generally Stephen R. Miller, Legal Neighborhoods, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105
(2013) (exploring neighborhood institutions); Crowder, supra note 71, at 638–39 (regarding the
powerful role of the “business elite” in local development).
201. See Cook County Forest Preserve District, supra note 36, at 7 (noting that the District’s
“original plan was to conduct a series of public outreach meetings to identify properties that should be
considered for acquisition,” but were “warned against broad-based outreach that might inundate the
District with offers of unsuitable property, and instead encouraged a more targeted outreach effort”).
202. What constitutes a balanced recipe is, of course, not a neutral exercise either, nor is the
decision to seek one in the first place. See Sara C. Bronin, Rules of the Road: The Struggle for Safety
& the Unmet Promise of Federalism, 106 IOWA L. REV. 2153, 2183 (2021) (showing that decisions to
enable certain forms of participation can be non-neutral where legal mandates are absent).
203. See Crowder, supra note 71, at 636–39 (associating informality with exclusionary local
participation regimes).
204. Atlanta Dept. of Parks and Recreation, supra note 37, at 4–6.
205. See id. at 4–5. See also Atlanta Dept. of Parks and Recreation, Community Parks and
Greenspace Program, Property Identification Questionnaire (July 25, 2013) (on file with author).
206. Atlanta Dept. of Parks and Recreation, supra note 37, at 5.
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proposal.207 The final acquisition decision is a product of these parallel efforts:
the Green Team’s external assessment and the Department’s internal one. As
a consequence, at least where the Department’s policy is being followed, a
broad coalition of participants are cultivated and incorporated into the
acquisition process.
A similar regime exists in Cook County, Illinois, where the Forest Preserve
District employs an interdisciplinary advisory team to assess potential
acquisitions and encourages proposals from a variety of community
stakeholders.208 Unlike in Atlanta, however, the District expressly includes
proactive features into its acquisition policy.209 It affirmatively interviews
planners and nonprofit experts across the region to seek feedback on potential
acquisitions, disseminates surveys to identify properties, and conducts outreach
to maintain an ongoing list of target acquisitions.210 These proactive efforts
further the role of District staff as mediators of parkland knowledge, not simply
technocratic experts, and it offers diverse public stakeholders a number of entry
points into the acquisition regime.
Proactive outreach can diversify participation even where internal
acquisition regimes are more informal.211 Yet informality cuts both ways.
Where an agency’s internal regime is both informal in structure and reactive in
how it identifies parkland, certain stakeholders have a disproportionate
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Those who work in
the real estate and construction fields—developers, brokers, agents, and land
use attorneys—approach park agencies absent any institutional prodding or
outreach to lend their voice to the acquisition regime.212 Neighbors who live
adjacent to existing parkland also come into contact with an agency in a way
other community members do not; they may see employees conducting
maintenance or initiate dialogue when a boundary issue arises.213 These
interactions breed informal networks.214 If outside stakeholders aren’t offered
the same access, networks forged with developers and neighbors can privilege

207. Id. at 5–6.
208. See Cook County Forest Preserve District, supra note 36, at 7.
209. Id. at 12 (discussing features such as recreation uses, greenway and bike trail connections,
and buffers).
210. Id. at 7–8.
211. See generally Edward W. De Barbieri, Urban Anticipatory Governance, 46 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 75 (2018) (arguing for proactive local governance as a way to improve public participation).
212. See Telephone Interview with Paul Sun, supra note 15 (discussing such interactions).
213. See Telephone Interview with Kelly Grissman, supra note 16 (discussing relationships with
private parties that own “inholdings” adjacent to parkland).
214. See Telephone Interview with Allen Ishibashi, supra note 17 (regarding informal
relationship building). See also supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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those interests in the acquisition process, marginalizing more disadvantaged
local voices as a consequence.215
In sum, the relationship between parkland acquisition and participation is a
symbiotic one. An agency’s internal legal regime impacts the type and variety
of stakeholder granted a voice in acquisition. At the same time, stakeholders
help mold the legal regime itself by guiding where property is being acquired
and coloring how strongly an agency’s internal plans, policies, and institutional
expertise dominate the process. This observation does not, however, fully
answer the core question posed above: How do agency practices yield
normative policy outcomes? The formality of the agency’s acquisition regime
surely comes into play. So too does the approach it takes to outreach. But
pulling together these variables requires an empirical assessment of local
policies and outcomes, a task to which the next section of this Article turns.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF NEW PARK PROPERTIES
Identifying the informal legal regime of parkland acquisition is only half
the task. As demonstrated by the examples drawn from Miami, Cleveland, St.
Louis, Atlanta, Cook County, and others, local acquisition regimes share a
number of unifying attributes and challenges but have the potential for
tremendous diversity in vision, governance, and implementation. How to sort
through this mess? How can local administrators, state legislatures, courts, and
members of the public assess the value of a particular regime in practice? And
what can acquisition teach us about the tradeoffs inherent in informal, sublocal
governance more broadly?
Any comprehensive effort to answer these questions must parse through an
enormous body of law and data—through potentially millions of discrete park
acquisition decisions, aggregated across tens of thousands of policies and park
agencies across the country. This is a tall and necessarily imperfect task. Yet
the sheer breadth of local agencies also presents an opportunity to perform a
representative analysis: to assess parkland practices and outcomes across a
sampling of agencies, extracting in the process some signposts for future
research and some qualified answers to the questions posed above.216
As a starting point, even if the regime of parkland acquisition cannot be
pinpointed in a provision of law, its outcomes can be plotted on a map. The
result of a decision to acquire property—or a decision not to acquire property—
is perhaps a rare moment of local policymaking that lends itself to easy visuals.
215. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
216. In a similar vein, the National Recreation and Park Association releases an annual report of
park agency data, which collects survey data from participating agencies to offer representative
guidance for local administrators. See 2021 NRPA Agency Performance Review, supra note 151.
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In an environment of limited resources, as discussed above, one agency might
focus its time and funding on a corner of its jurisdiction that lacks greenspace
access or contains high-quality conservation habitats; another might focus on
growing existing parks or building pocket parks on residential blocks. These
decisions can populate on a map, painting a visual study of how individual
policy choices turn into sublocal practice. Geographic data offers tangible
guidance to public officials and may inform future policy and lawmaking.217
A number of local park agencies and their partner governments offer maps
of park properties or online parcel databases that can be searched to identify
local greenspace.218 Yet no map exists that compares parkland acquisitions
across jurisdictions, let alone one that assesses those acquisitions over a
relatively recent or comparable time period.219 This Article’s preliminary
empirical task, therefore, is to collect, distill, and plot acquisition data from a
cross-section of park agencies. Once mapped, acquisition data can then be used
to compare the relationship between the salient features of an agency’s
regime—the formality of its internal policies, structure, and practices—against
the outcome of those features aggregated across a number of acquisitions and
years.220 The exercise offers a cross-jurisdictional lesson for those who mold
local institutional structures and for the communities impacted by them.

217. See, e.g., John R. Taylor & Sarah Taylor Lovell, Mapping Public and Private Spaces of
Urban Agriculture in Chicago through the Analysis of High-Res Aerial Images in Google Earth, 108
LANDSCAPE AND URB. PLAN. 57, 65–66 (2012) (showing how a geospatial analysis can help develop
local policies).
218. See, e.g., Johnson County Department of Technology & Innovation, supra note 2; City of
Jacksonville JaxGIS, supra note 8.
219. Indispensable parkland maps have been created by the Trust for Public Land, the national
leader in local park policy and the premier source for cross-jurisdictional park data. See supra note 22
and accompanying text. But national data on recent parkland acquisition remains lacking. Studying
recent data is particularly important in the local parkland context, where, as a function of their
informality, acquisition regimes are susceptible to institutional evolution within a given agency, due
both to external factors (for example, changing land use patterns in the locality) and internal ones (new
agency employees making new decisions, engaging different stakeholders, and amassing and applying
different principles drawn from their experience). See Kibel, supra note 14, at 352–59 (describing
changing circumstances and policies that fostered different acquisition outcomes over time at the East
Bay Regional Park District). See also supra notes 184–86 (regarding the ability of individual staff to
change policy). Due to the potential for significant institutional change over time, an appraisal of an
agency’s internal policies today must be assessed against parkland acquisitions made over a relatively
recent timeframe.
220. Comparative local government law offers a rich opportunity to identify and shape best
practices of local governance. See Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 62, at 132–33. To achieve an
honest assessment of local institutional design, however, it is important to consider the outcomes and
impacts of those designs and the practices resulting therefrom. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The
New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1214 (2014).
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A. The Methodological Framework
Local agencies lie at the heart of our park acquisition analysis. To assemble
a focus group of these agencies, data from two preeminent nongovernment
organizations—the Trust for Public Land and the National Association of
County Park and Recreation Officials (NACPRO)—was used to create a
representative cross-sample of large agencies across three institutional forms:
the 40 general and special purpose city agencies that own 5,000 or more acres
of parkland; the 38 general and special purpose county agencies that employ
200 or more employees; and the 16 regional park authorities that own and
manage property across city and county jurisdictions on a metropolitan level.221
Together these 94 entities are responsible for local greenspace in many of the
largest urban and suburban areas in the United States.
Why the focus on large agencies? In significant part, large agencies offer
diversity and scale, both in operations and in impact. Owning more properties
and employing more employees provides large agencies more latitude to
experiment with varying degrees of formality, develop institutional cultures,
and perhaps even acquire more property—and thus offer more data points to
analyze—as a product of their greater budgets, inventories, and political
visibility.222 The policies and practices of large agencies also affect more
people and engage with (or alternatively, fail to engage with) more constituent
stakeholders. Finally, as a matter of methodological convenience, limiting the
analysis to larger agencies offers a neutral scalpel for extracting a manageable
sample from the vast universe of local parkland—and in the process, still
capturing a cross-section of institutional forms, state jurisdictions, geographic
regions, and local land use patterns.
Once selected, the ninety-four agencies were contacted and asked to
provide two items: first, a list of all properties acquired in fee simple since 2010,
and second, any and all policies, plans, procedures, or documents that pertain
to the agency’s parkland acquisition process. Formal public records requests
were submitted wherever an agency was nonresponsive to informal outreach.
Ultimately, nearly every authority provided some form of response to the
221. See generally 2020 Acreage & Park System Highlights, THE TRUST FOR PUB. LAND,
https://web.tplgis.org/parkservedatadownloads/Acreage_Park_System_Highlights_WEB_DATA_TA
BLES_City_Park_Facts_2020.xlsx [https://perma.cc/3VR9-PTAU]; E-mail from Brenda AdamsWeyant, Exec. Dir., NACPRO, to the author (Oct. 9, 2020) (on file with author) (sharing employee
data from 889 county park agencies). Employee counts were used to assess a county agency’s size
because no comparative national-level data exists on the acreage owned by county park agencies. See
id.
222. See 2021 NRPA Agency Performance Review, supra note 151, at 4, 11, 23–24 (finding that
larger agencies have more public interactions, offer more programming, and have larger capital
budgets—of which an average of 8% is allocated for acquisition).
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query.223 Usable acquisition data was mapped using ArcGIS software, while
further outreach was conducted when an agency provided data that could not
be analyzed.224 At the end of the exercise a total of 5,120 recent property
acquisitions—representing fifty park agencies and hundreds of internal policy
documents—had been mapped and analyzed.
This data was then used to compare the internal policies of the fifty park
agencies with their acquisitions outcomes. Each agency’s internal regime was
reviewed and evaluated based on its degree of informality. As a matter of
written procedure, an agency’s plans and policies were coded on a scale from
“1” to “4,” with the low end of the scale indicating an agency with no
acquisition planning documents, and the high end indicating an express,
detailed, and operational internal process. As a matter of institutional practice,
moreover, each local acquisition regime was also evaluated to determine
whether the agency’s practices are (1) informal or formal and (2) proactive or
reactive in nature.225

223. An exception was Harris County, Texas, which is divided into four precincts. Precinct One
did not provide a response to the public records request but did offer some background on its
acquisition process. See Telephone Interview with Amar Mohite, Director of Planning &
Infrastructure, Harris County Precinct One (May 6, 2021) (on file with author). The outreach process
was nevertheless an exercise in the value of state public records laws and the deficiencies that
characterize their applicability in practice. See generally Christina Koningisor, Transparency Deserts,
114 NW. U. L. REV. 1461 (2020). Few of the agencies provided responses within the statutory
timeframe, while some did not respond until an appeal was filed or legal action threatened.
224. Acquisition data may be unusable for a number of reasons. A few common examples are
illustrative. At the most challenging level, an acquisition list might include only bare property
descriptions, absent any identifying geographic features. See, e.g., Salt Lake County, List of Open
Space Lands (Sept. 1, 2018) (on file with author); Response to Public Records Request from Loudoun
County Parks, Recreation & Community Services to Wendy Xu, Univ. of Detroit Mercy Sch. of L.
(Apr. 15, 2021) (on file with author) (providing a list of park acquisitions). A list might alternatively
describe the properties in some detail, but not in detail sufficient to compare against the reference
datasets or shapefiles created by the local city or county—which at times could not be downloaded or
purchased. A shapefile could not be obtained for Gwinnett County, for example, whereas property
information needed to link with an available shapefile could not be obtained for San Diego County or
Indianapolis. Wherever possible, further outreach was conducted, or further public records requests
were submitted, in an effort to improve the quality of data being received.
225. Agencies that affirmatively seek parkland acquisition opportunities or affirmatively engage
diverse stakeholders were considered proactive. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text
(regarding Cook County). Agencies that operate with set acquisition processes and criteria were
considered formal, see supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (regarding Miami-Dade), while those
with bare or no processes or criteria—or alternatively, processes and criteria that rely on unstructured
institutional knowledge and culture—were labeled as informal, see supra notes 86–94 (regarding
Cleveland Metroparks and St. Louis County). By its nature an assessment of informality is an
imperfect science. As a consequence, agencies that did not clearly lean towards one criterion or the
other were excluded from this latter component of the analysis.

ROSENBAUM_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

A LEGAL MAP OF NEW LOCAL PARKLAND

767

B. Incorporating Normative Values
All of these assessments were made with the overarching goal of providing
some semblance of quantifiable order to the yet hazy and diverse universe of
local park acquisition. But how to assess outcomes? As explored above,
greenspace acquisition and location have far-ranging impacts upon local
communities.226 Presumably, then, there are a number of normative values that
could be advanced when an agency purchases a given parcel or prepares an
internal acquisition plan. In order to assess whether a regime’s outcomes are
effective, it is necessary to identify at baseline which policy goals are most
valuable, or, at minimum, which ones can stand as useful barometers of
institutional efficacy.
Two such policy goals were chosen for purposes of this Article. The first
is the goal of geographic efficiency—the value of locating new park parcels
next to existing ones. The second is the goal of expanding access to greenspace
for local residents, and in particular, for residents who have been inequitably
saddled with substandard access as a matter of environmental injustice.
These goals were chosen for a number of practical and substantive reasons.
Most practically, one or both of these goals was adopted by every park agency
studied for this Article that articulated a vision or purpose behind its acquisition
planning.227 The widespread embrace of the goals reflects their prominence and
perceived value to local park administrators. Moreover, because the agencies
themselves have embraced geographic efficiency and access equity, it is
possible to assess institutional outcomes on a level playing field, one that can
directly appraise how aspirational policy goals translate into administrative
reality. A final practical reason hearkens back to the examples drawn from
Johnson County and Jacksonville at the onset of this Article: the values of
geographic efficiency and access equity are not necessarily harmonious with
each other.228 Acquiring property adjacent to existing parkland promotes the
first value, but perhaps does so at the expense of the latter. Likewise, creating
new parks in communities that have historically lacked greenspace promotes
226. See infra Part I(A).
227. See, e.g., Louisville Metro Parks and Recreation, Land Acquisition Policy (July 1, 2008)
(on file with author) (asking whether a property is “[l]ocated adjacent to an existing park” and
“[l]ocated in an area . . . that needs open space and/or recreation facilities”); Monmouth County Park
System, Open Space Plan 2019, MONMOUTH CNTY., N.J., 45 (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.co.monmouth.nj.us/documents/132/Open-Space-Plan-2019-Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FXZ9-AJYQ] (listing as priorities “[a]dditions to existing County parks” and “[n]ew
park sites . . . in underserved areas”); Mecklenburg County Park and Recreation Department, Park &
Recreation Land Acquisition (Feb. 23, 2021) (on file with author) (listing “acquiring parcels adjacent
to existing parks” and “acquiring parklands in service gap areas”).
228. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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access equity, but it might geographically fragment the agency’s park inventory
in the process. Examining both outcomes allows for an evaluation of how
internal law adjudicates between the two.
Such practical considerations notwithstanding, the values of geographic
efficiency and access equity also resonate in the legal scholarship, where both
are associated with pressing challenges of property and local government law.
From a property law perspective, geographic park consolidation serves as a
crucial antidote to the problem of land fragmentation, a costly source of
management and ecological inefficiencies.229 When public property is
fractured, governments face higher maintenance and transaction costs.230
Boundary surveys become costly and challenging, spawning errors and gaps in
property data.231 Fractured parcels also tend to be smaller and more difficult to
access.232 In the parkland context, these smaller properties may attract fewer
public resources and host fewer recreational amenities—as a consequence
limiting the health advantages a smaller park can confer upon its community.233
Fragmentation is particularly troublesome where conservation efforts are
concerned. Because habitats inevitably cross human-drawn boundary lines,
ecological communities benefit when land areas are larger and more
consolidated.234 Scale is needed to connect those habitats, enable migrations,
and sustain biodiversity.235 Bringing adjacent properties under unified
229. See generally James J. Kelly, Jr., Freeing the City to Compete, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 569,
572–73 (2017) (discussing transaction costs on fractured local land).
230. Id.
231. See Scott K. Miller, Missing the Forest and the Trees: Lost Opportunities for Federal Land
Exchanges, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 197, 214 (2013) (discussing surveys on fractured federal land);
Anderson, supra note 220, at 1172 (discussing data deficiencies tied to fractured public land in Detroit).
232. Davis, supra note 24, at 135 (noting that local agencies have “small preserves segmented
by roads and traffic”). See also Merry J. Chavez, Public Access to Landlocked Public Lands, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1987).
233. See, e.g., Christopher C. Weiss, Marnie Purciel, Michael D. M. Bader, J. Quinn, G. Lovasi,
K. Neckerman & A. Rundle, Reconsidering Access: Park Facilities and Neighborhood Disamenities
in
New
York
City,
88
J.
URB.
HEALTH
297,
307
(2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3079030/ [https://perma.cc/UBP5-H5Q3] (noting
that “neighborhood-level access to large, but not small parks, has been found to be associated with
lower BMI”).
234. See Robert B. Keiter, Toward A National Conservation Network Act: Transforming
Landscape Conservation on the Public Lands into Law, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 129 (2018)
(discussing the value of “landscape scale management”); Craig L. Shafer, The Unspoken Option to
Help Safeguard America’s National Parks: An Examination of Expanding U.S. National Park
Boundaries by Annexing Adjacent Federal Lands, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57, 72–73 (2010)
(observing that boundaries are “ineffective” for purposes of conservation); Fink, supra note 23, at 92–
93 (discussing research on the connection between species extinction and land area).
235. See Shafer, supra note 234, at 64, 85 (“The smaller the park, the more rapid the extinction
rate has been.”).
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ownership can promote these efforts.236 Alternatively, when parks or other
local greenspaces are fragmented, wildlife habitats are splintered as well, a
potentially destructive process for local animal and plant populations.237 Once
fragmented, moreover, habitats are difficult to restore.238 They are isolated by
urban and suburban development;239 exposed to degradation and invasive
species;240 and stymied by inhospitable zoning and land use regimes.241 As
local governments assume more prominent roles in environmental
conservation, ecological fragmentation, once the domain of regional and
national entities, becomes a local concern too.242
Conservationists and public officials struggle to surmount these hurdles.
Smaller properties lack the political visibility and support enjoyed by a larger
area of conserved land.243 Despite public support for local conservation writ
large, fractured parcels still face a heightened risk of ecological degradation,
impeding conservation efforts from getting off the ground and jeopardizing the
long-term viability of those that do.244 In this manner, parkland fragmentation
does not merely hamper and complicate the work of local park agencies, but it
can also undercut conservation and preservation efforts that lie at the very heart
236. At the federal land management level, courts have emphasized the importance of
considering adjacent properties when considering conservation and development decisions of federal
agencies. See Keiter, supra note 234, at 102–04. Adjacent land acquisitions are also valuable in the
context of local land management. See, e.g., Vill. of Fox River Valley Gardens v. Lake Cnty. Forest
Pres. Dist., 586 N.E.2d 813, 820–21 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (examining and interpreting a statute that
promotes local government acquisition of contiguous conservation land). The Fox River Valley
Gardens court defined “contiguous” in this context to include “tracts of land [that] touch or adjoin each
other in a reasonably substantial physical sense or where the parcels have a substantial common
boundary or a common border of reasonable length or width.” Id. at 821 (internal citations omitted).
237. Colburn, supra note 36, at 960 n.61, 961; Fink, supra note 23, at 96 (noting that plant
species also benefit from habitat linkages). See also Susan Jane M. Brown, David and Goliath:
Reformulating the Definition of “The Public Interest” and the Future of Land Swaps After the
Interstate 90 Land Exchange, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 235, 236 (2000).
238. Brown, supra note 237, at 236; see also Keiter, supra note 234, at 90–91 (noting that the
“enclave theory of nature conservation has not been working”).
239. Davis, supra note 24, at 134.
240. Id. at 135.
241. Colburn, supra note 36, at 974.
242. See Sarah Fox, Localizing Environmental Federalism, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 149–
151 (2020) (observing that “local action on environmental issues has entered a new period of
considerable activity” and that “[l]ocal leadership on environmental issues is expected to continue to
increase, and to be increasingly important”). The increased prominence of local action in the
environmental space is, in part, a consequence of federal and state inaction on the issue. See id.
243. See Colburn, supra note 36, at 968, 968 n.93. See also Davis, supra note 24, at 152
(“[P]articipation in land management at the local level is typically more ad hoc and dependent on
sporadic bursts of activism.”).
244. See Colburn, supra note 36, at 946–47.
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of their missions.245 A park agency can ameliorate the problem by focusing its
acquisition strategy upon properties adjacent to existing parks, thereby
protecting habitats at the edge of existing park boundaries from encroachment
while also promoting management and administrative efficiencies down the
road.246
In doing so, however, as set forth above, the strategy serves to expand
greenspace in a community that already enjoys park access. The strategy comes
at the expense of another value emphasized in legal scholarship: the imperative
of officials and stakeholders to advocate for equitable parkland access as a
matter of environmental justice.247
Scholars have documented how
marginalized communities in metropolitan areas—namely, communities of
color and economic distress—contain fewer park acres and more limited
parkland access, a product of intentional local policy and a byproduct of
discriminatory real estate, land use, and historical housing practices.248 These
communities are denied the same health, economic, and civic benefits enjoyed

245. Id. at 974. Regarding the important role played by local-level land conservation, see
Tarlock, supra note 36; Keiter, supra note 234, at 74.
246. Regarding the “edge effect” in conservation biology, see Fink, supra note 23, at 93–94.
247. The term “environmental justice” has been used to describe efforts to confront two closely
related issues: environmental racism (which stems from deliberately-caused disparities) and
environmental inequity (which stems from disparities that may or may not have been deliberate in
origin). Kibel, supra note 14, at 334–35. Because the literature indicates that parkland disparities are
caused by discriminatory policies and outcomes both invidious and otherwise, see infra note 248 and
accompanying text, this Article will employ “environmental justice” to encompass both concepts.
248. The Trust for Public Land has closely studied and documented park access inequities. See
The Heat is On, supra note 21; Ronda Chapman, Parks and Equity, in PARKS AND AN EQUITABLE
RECOVERY
5,
5–6
(The
Tr.
for
Pub.
Land,
May
27,
2021),
https://www.tpl.org/sites/default/files/Parks%20and%20an%20equitable%20recovery%20%20The%20Trust%20for%20Public%20Land.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BPV-BTDT]. See also Fox,
supra note 45, at 843 (“[U]rban researchers have extensively documented the disparity between access
to parks and open space in low-income communities as compared to their more affluent counterparts.”);
Christopher J. Tyson, From Ferguson to Flint: In Search of an Antisubordination Principle for Local
Government Law, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 31–32 (2018) (arguing that “the design of
bridges, highways and public parks have all been deployed in various cases to exclude black people
from spaces intended for whites”); Kibel, supra note 14, 337–71 (citing studies that demonstrate
parkland access disparities, then tracing such disparities across several governmental entities at the
federal, state, and local levels). See also generally Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing
Discrimination from the Built Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2013). Intentional park exclusion
historically occurred as a matter of law, whereas today park exclusion operates through more indirect
legal and policy channels and as a legacy of historical exclusion. See Sarah Schindler, Architectural
Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124
YALE L.J. 1934, 1990 (2015); Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State
and Local Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 357–58
(2000) (citing cases).
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by those in park-rich areas.249 While the concept of environmental justice was
first defined by advocates and commentators who expressed alarm at the
disparate harms imposed excessively upon marginalized areas—for example,
the disproportionate concentration of heavy industry, waste facilities, and other
undesirable land uses near marginalized residential neighborhoods—the theory
has since expanded to recognize that a lack of recreational and natural amenities
in these same neighborhoods constitutes environmental injustice in another
form.250 Commentators have recently emphasized the unequal distribution of
environmental benefits in local communities, with parks serving as a crucial
cog in the push for local resource equity.251 Advocates seeking greenspace
equity do not ask local agencies to close facilities in park-rich neighborhoods.
Rather, their efforts focus understandably on the acquisition process—on the
sublocal decisions that guide parkland creation and could create more parks in
areas currently lacking them.252
Land fragmentation and parkland inequity often share common histories of
exclusion and segregation.253 Even so, confronting their shared consequences
is still a challenge that yields uneven remedies, one that demands deliberative
institutional design.254 Whether consciously or not, local park administrators
adjudicate between efficiency and access when creating planning documents,
drafting internal policies, considering whether to commit staff resources to a
proposed donation, and deciding to allocate limited grant or millage funds
towards a particular land purchase. How the policies and practices they employ
correlate with these institutional outcomes, if at all, can frame a rubric for
sublocal governance in the field of parkland acquisition and beyond.

249. See supra Part I(A).
250. Catherine Millas Kaiman, Environmental Justice and Community-Based Reparations, 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1327, 1338 (2016); Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 36, at 337.
251. Fox, supra note 45, at 852–53; Crawford, supra note 132, at 911. At the same time,
however, because parks bring economic benefits to their surrounding communities, the creation of new
parkland has also been associated with gentrification and displacement. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
252. Kibel, supra note 14, at 340.
253. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through the
Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2484 (2018) (discussing historical local
patterns of fragmentation as a tool for segregation).
254. See id. at 2485 (“Exclusion and inequality constructed through differential access to public
goods suggests that the remedy for this form of structural inequality requires the creation of governance
institutions capable of overseeing and managing these goods and services, thereby providing a layer of
checks and balances over the system and network of service providers.”).
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C. Limits in the Methodological Framework
A few qualifications and limitations should be acknowledged in the
methodology set forth above. As a global point, it is worth reiterating a
fundamental obstacle noted elsewhere in this Article: local and sublocal entities
are incredibly diverse. Even a cross-section of park agencies that aims to be
representative will not perfectly capture this governance landscape.255 For
instance, the cross-section of ninety-four agencies chosen for this Article was
selected based on institutional size for the reasons set forth above—but in doing
so, our conclusions may not speak for smaller agencies, nor for acquisition
practices outside the metropolitan areas where larger agencies tend to be
located.256 Moreover, the 5,120 acquisitions ultimately mapped and analyzed
represent the fifty agencies for which such analysis was possible. This biased
the study towards entities with more effective recordkeeping and more usable
public reference data, possibly self-selecting for agencies with more robust,
formal, or deliberative acquisition regimes as well.
Institutional practices also differ in ways this Article does not directly
capture. Despite the value of fee simple ownership,257 some local agencies
prioritize other property interests and acquisition forms, whereas others do not
prioritize acquisition at all.258 And despite generally sharing the normative
255. See Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 62, at 142 (acknowledging, in a study of local
bikeshare policies, that “[l]ocal government law regimes, like law systems in general, differ in many
variables” and thus “[i]t would be impossible . . . to provide a comprehensive review of all that legally
sets apart the cities that have adopted bike share plans.”). Despite these differences, this Article
operates on the assumption, reinforced by its empirical data, that there are trans-jurisdictional lessons
to learn from comparing local governments. See Davidson, supra note 54, at 633 (“[T]he Article has
assumed that an appropriate starting point is also trans-jurisdictional—factors that might be
theoretically relevant to understanding local administrative praxis are not unique to California, or
Missouri, or Maine . . . .).
256. The connection between agency size and regional population is evident from the agencies
used in this study. Agencies chosen for this Article represent nineteen of the twenty largest
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States. See Annual Resident Population Estimates
and Estimated Components of Resident Population Change for Metropolitan and Micropolitan
Statistical Areas and Their Geographic Components, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/technical-documentation/research/evaluationestimates/2020-evaluation-estimates/2010s-totals-metro-and-micro-statistical-areas.html
[https://perma.cc/GY7B-AN7H] (showing the only non-represented MSA as Boston-CambridgeNewton, MA-NH). Unsurprisingly, more populous states are also well-represented in the study, with
thirteen local agencies in California alone.
257. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Amar Mohite, supra note 223 (discussing how the
agency focuses on recreational amenities in existing parks and building flood infrastructure, not
obtaining new park sites); Telephone Interview with Clement Lau, supra note 17 (discussing the
agency’s focus on parkland expansion outside the fee simple acquisition model); E-mail from Tom
Korosei, supra note 16 (discussing the agency’s focus on maintaining existing parkland).
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goals of geographic efficiency and access equity—or at least, professing to
share them259—agencies do not all define and pursue these goals identically.
Some seek to achieve them through efforts that a geospatial analysis may not
reflect, for example by bolstering public transit instead of creating new parks
in greenspace deserts.260 A meticulous accounting of these divergences falls
beyond the scope of the present analysis. The metrics chosen and assessed
serve as imperfect proxies for park agency policies and outcomes, an approach
driven by the informal and heterogeneous nature of the field.
A number of statistically significant findings can nevertheless be drawn
from the data.261 But in light of the limitations described above, this Article
stresses restraint in the sweep of its conclusions. It does not claim to offer the
definitive account of local park acquisition or the final word on local acquisition
regimes. What it aims to accomplish, as an empirical matter, is to identify
where relationships appear in the data between institutional policies, practices,
and acquisition outcomes, notwithstanding the myriad additional variables at
play in the local parks universe. When statistically significant, these
relationships are still instructive. They offer a snapshot of acquisition
regimes—and lessons for those who administer and are impacted by them.
D. Assessing the Results
The empirical component of this Article analyzed 5,120 property
acquisitions across fifty park agencies nationwide.262 What can we learn from
this analysis? As set forth above, each agency’s internal acquisition regime was
evaluated and classified, first based upon the nature and extent of its written
procedures and second upon a scoring of its institutional practices—whether its
acquisition regime is formal or informal, proactive or reactive in nature.263
Every property was then mapped and assessed through the frameworks of
geographic efficiency and access equity. When looking at its surrounding
neighborhood, is a new park parcel located adjacent to existing parkland—or is

259. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
260. See Kibel, supra note 14, at 367 (discussing the use of public transit as a way to reduce park
access inequities). See also Schindler, supra note 248, at 1954 (exploring a number of causes and
manifestations of access inequity, including where a community lacks sidewalks or crosswalks). A
park may be geographically proximal to a neighborhood but still poorly accessible in practice due to
these and other impediments prevailing in the built environment.
261. See infra Part IV(D).
262. See infra Table 1. The fifty agencies reported acquiring a total of 5,508 properties since
2010. However, 388 of these properties could not be located and mapped, likely due to errors or
deficits in the property data, the reference data, or both.
263. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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it located in a neighborhood with no preexisting greenspace?264 Is the new park
in a low-income community or one more diverse than its metropolitan region
as a whole?265 Answering these questions yielded a trove of geographic data
about each property, a snapshot of acquisition outcomes that could be compared
against the written procedures and institutional practices of the park agencies.
Before turning to the statistical analysis, it is worth offering some initial
observations. Of the 5,120 park properties mapped, 1,999 of them—or 39% of
the total—are located adjacent to existing greenspace.266 An additional 2,282
fall within a 0.25 mile radius of existing parkland, meaning that the vast
majority of acquisitions mapped for this Article (just under 84% of the total)
are located in communities with preexisting greenspace, a striking outcome
when considering that over 100 million Americans lack walkable park
access.267 The demographic data paints a more balanced picture. Almost half
of the acquired properties (2,307, or 45%) are located in census tracts that are
lower-income than their metropolitan region as a whole, while 2,251 properties
(44%) fall in census tracts that can be considered diverse when compared
against the regional baseline.268 Even so, these results indicate that most of the
properties acquired over the past ten years are not in low-income areas;
likewise, most are not in areas of relative diversity. Considering the emphasis
agencies place on access equity, these outcomes may be surprising.269

264. Two metrics were used to answer this question. First, using shapefiles of park properties
located in the city or county at issue, each acquired parcel was scored based upon its adjacency, a
measure of whether any other park parcel shares a common boundary with it. Second, a similar
assessment was performed to identify whether any other park parcels fall within a 0.25-mile radius of
the acquired one.
265. For each acquired parcel, census data illuminated whether that parcel is (1) located in a
census tract where household income falls below its Metropolitan Statistical Area’s (MSA’s) median
household income, (2) located in a census tract where households fall disproportionately below the
federal poverty level, as compared against the MSA as a whole, and (3) located in a census tract where
the percent of non-Hispanic whites is ten percent or more above that of the MSA as a whole. These
metrics were used to approximate census tracts—and thus, roughly, neighborhoods—that are on
average poorer or more diverse as compared against their metropolitan regions. All data was drawn
from American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019) (Table S0601).
266. See infra Table 1.
267. See id.; Joseph W. Kane & Adie Tomer, Parks Make Great Places, But Not Enough
Americans
Can
Reach
Them,
THE
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Aug.
21,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/08/21/parks-make-great-places-but-not-enoughamericans-can-reach-them/ [https://perma.cc/DFR6-YJ2X].
268. See infra Table 1; see also supra notes 264, 265 (discussing the census data underpinning
these figures).
269. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. Of the thirty-seven mapped agencies that
articulated acquisition priorities, thirty-four indicated access and equity as a goal.
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Yet raw acquisition numbers explain only so much in a vacuum. Adjacent
property may be easier to acquire and cheaper to maintain; lower-income areas
might have higher densities and less available land for new greenspace.270 An
agency might have expended significant time and resources since 2010 to create
new parks elsewhere, even if these efforts are not proportionately reflected in
the raw numerical outcomes. Standing alone, acquisition outcomes speak to
prevailing land use patterns and other externalities, not simply to the policies
that enabled them.
More instructive is a comparative assessment of these outcomes: whether
there are any statistically significant associations between an agency’s
acquisitions and its internal regimes. Do agencies with express, detailed, and
operational written procedures acquire more park property? Is an agency that
proactively engages stakeholders in the acquisition process more likely to
acquire properties in low-income areas? What about an agency that displays
informal acquisition practices? These questions seek to understand where
casual connections exist, if anywhere, between salient institutional frameworks
and their policy results.
To answer them, statistical tests were employed to study associations
between the categorical variables, with a p value less than 0.05 being
considered statistically significant.271 Profitably, following these tests, a
number of significant associations emerged from the exercise. In addition,
cautious conclusions could also be drawn from a few associations that were not
deemed significant.
A prominent takeaway runs through the results: having written plans and
procedures translates into acquisition volume. Stark differences emerge when
comparing authorities coded as 4s (indicating express, detailed, and operational
planning and procedure documents) with those coded as 1s (indicating no
acquisition planning documents). Even when controlling for the varying sizes
of park jurisdictions,272 the former acquired significantly more properties than
the latter, with medians of 103.5 and 4.0 park parcels acquired since 2010,
270. See Kibel, supra note 14, at 362 (noting the interplay between density, income, and park
need).
271. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used to compare acquisition counts and counts per 100
square miles of property by agency priorities, and a Kruskall-Wallis test was used to compare counts
by the coded score of an agency’s written plans. A Fisher’s exact test was used to test the associations
of categorical variables. All models were created by Harlan McCaffery, M.A., M.S., Statistical
Consultant, Center for Human Growth and Development, University of Michigan.
272. Jurisdictional size was drawn from 2010 census data when an agency’s jurisdiction is
coterminous with the boundaries, and thus the census-defined land area, of a city or county. See
generally Census of Population and Housing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010). For special purpose
agencies and other cases of non-coterminous coverage, local shapefile data was used to map and
estimate jurisdictional area.
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respectively.273 These distinctions present across the board. Agencies in the
middle of the spectrum—those coded 2s and 3s, i.e. those with generic or
aspirational written policies—acquired more properties than those with no
written policies, yet fewer properties than agencies with operative and detailed
plans.274 A similar trend evidenced when considering geographic outcomes:
agencies higher on the spectrum were significantly more likely to acquire
properties near existing greenspace and also significantly more likely to acquire
properties in low-income and diverse communities.275 Simply put, the more
full-throated the policy, the more acquisitions of all stripes we can expect to see
in the final tally.276
Yet these conclusions come with a twist. While having written plans and
procedures appears significant, the priorities expressed in those documents do
not necessarily translate to real-world outcomes. Statistical tests were
performed to compare each agency’s self-professed priorities—whether it
values geographic efficiency, access equity, neither, or both—with the
geographic outcomes found in the raw data. No statistically significant
associations emerged from this exercise.277 Agencies that value geographic
efficiency did not, to a statically significant degree, acquire more property near
or adjacent to existing greenspace.278 Likewise, agencies that value access
equity were not associated with more acquisitions in low-income communities,
nor in communities more diverse than their regions at large.279 We ultimately

273. See infra Table 2.
274. Agencies coded as 2s (indicating references to acquisition in larger planning documents)
acquired a median of 25.0 parcels while agencies coded as 3s (indicating discrete yet aspirational
acquisition plans and documents) acquired a median of 49.5 parcels. See id.
275. These results were demonstrated through both bivariate and multiple regression modelling.
When comparing agencies coded as 4s with those coded as 1s, the former was 11.8 times more likely
to acquire properties near existing greenspace and 12.2 times more likely to acquire properties in lowincome census tracts.
276. See infra Table 2.
277. See infra Table 3.
278. See id. While agencies that value geographic efficiency did acquire more properties
adjacent and proximal to existing greenspace, the p values for these associations are 0.301 and 0.125,
respectively, indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and there might not be a correlation
between values and outcomes.
279. See id. One association comes close to our significance threshold: agencies that prioritize
access equity acquired a median of 19.5 properties in diverse communities (with an interquartile range
of 2.0 to 53.0), whereas those that did not express this priority in planning and policy documents
acquired a median of only 1.0 properties in diverse communities (with an interquartile range of 0.5 to
3.0), yielding a p value of 0.07. A statistically significant association between these variables might
emerge from a larger sample size. On the other hand, the p value for the association increases when
controlling for jurisdictional size (to a value of 0.19), cautioning against any predictions as to how
these numbers might shift under different circumstances.
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cannot reject the null hypothesis with respect to any of these associations.
Although this does not prove that an agency’s stated priorities have no
connection with its acquisition outcomes—a larger sample size might evince a
correlation that the current data does not—it suggests a possible disconnect
between the two.
If the priorities listed in planning and policy documents are uninstructive,
what factors, then, can anticipate park acquisition outcomes? The institutional
practices of local park agencies offer a partial answer. Whether an agency’s
acquisition practices are formal (or informal) and proactive (or reactive) is
significantly associated with its ability to create new parkland in diverse and
low-income communities. Agencies with formal practices have acquired a
median of 56.0 parks in low-income communities since 2010 and 22.0 parks in
communities more diverse than their regions, figures that contrast with 8.5 and
2.5 parks, respectively, among informal agencies.280 Reactive agencies,
conversely, have acquired far fewer properties in low-income (13.5 versus
56.0), high-poverty (5.5 versus 20.5), and diverse (4.5 versus 41.0)
communities when compared against proactive ones.281 All of these
associations carry p values well below 0.05.282 Interestingly, institutional
structure also plays a role in access equity outcomes, as special purpose park
agencies also acquire significantly more properties in low-income communities
than do general purpose city and county agencies.283 Three factors thus
correlate with access equity acquisitions: formality, proactivity, and being a
special purpose entity.
However, no such trends are evident where the goal of geographic
efficiency is assessed. Agencies with formal acquisition practices were not
statistically more likely to create new parks adjacent or proximal to existing
greenspace.284 Nor was geographic efficiency associated significantly with
proactive or reactive governance models.285 While some distinctions emerge in
the data that might prove notable with a larger or different sample size,286 none

280. See infra Table 4.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. Special purpose agencies have acquired a median of 69.5 park properties since 2010 (with
an interquartile range of 44.0 to 128.0), in contrast with a median of 6.5 park properties (with an
interquartile range of 0.0 to 22.0) acquired by general purpose agencies. The p value for this
association is 0.005, indicating a confident rejection of the null hypothesis.
284. See Table 4.
285. See id.
286. See id. The most prominent of these distinctions is the association between reactive
governance and acquisitions made within 0.25 miles of an existing park. Reactive agencies acquired
a median of 16.0 such properties, in comparison with 63.5 properties acquired by proactive agencies.
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of the tests conducted for this Article found a significant relationship between
institutional practices and adjacent or proximal acquisition outcomes. In
particular, local agencies appeared to obtain similar numbers of park-adjacent
parcels regardless of their governance models.287
These statistical tests offer several normative lessons about the sublocal
legal regime of parkland acquisition. Despite the heterogeneous nature of local
park agencies and the acquisition approaches they take, the results indicate, first
and foremost, that patterns do exist in these operative frameworks and that the
policy choices of local officials do translate into particular geographic
outcomes on the ground. As a matter of process, having written plans and
policies appears to serve a valuable signaling function: it demonstrates to
internal and external stakeholders that the agency is committed to creating new
parkland. The process of writing plans and policies might spur stakeholders to
expend more resources on acquisition, perhaps by emphasizing the agency’s
mission to internal actors and clarifying its accountability to public observers.
Conversely, it is also possible that an agency’s written plans and policies reflect
what its institutional culture has already embraced, a codification that can
reinforce and perpetuate that culture going forwards.288 In either case, these
written documents make a difference. Among the authorities analyzed for this
Article, they correlated with increased rates of park acquisition, on balance a
normative civic value for local communities.289
But ultimately, as a matter of substance, planning documents do not
translate into acquisition outcomes. Here, a distinct conclusion can be drawn
from the analysis: agencies acquire more parks in areas traditionally deprived
of greenspace when their acquisition practices are more formal or more
proactive in nature—or where the agency is a special purpose government
body. What do these characteristics have in common? Why might they all
promote access equity outcomes? Hearkening back to the examples drawn
from Miami, Cleveland, Atlanta, and Cook County, a common thread running
through all four is a deliberate, affirmative effort to draw diverse stakeholders
into the acquisition process. Formal acquisition regimes expressly include a
variety of community voices when park creation is being considered.290
Proactive regimes also make a conscious effort to engage outside stakeholders,
even when such engagement is not mandated by external law or internal

287. See id.
288. See supra notes 176–77, 182–86 and accompanying text (regarding expertise and
institutional culture).
289. See supra Part I(A).
290. See supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text (describing Atlanta’s formal regime).
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policy.291 And special purpose districts, while considered less politically
accountable in the legal literature,292 nevertheless appear more likely to operate
with formal requirements that encourage stakeholder engagement.293
Bringing more stakeholders to the table offers an opportunity for
geographic parkland diversity. Whereas the process of expanding an existing
park can occur organically—a neighbor reaches out; an employee spots a forsale sign; a parcel becomes available that the agency had long eyed to extend a
trail corridor294—the process of placing a new park in a new community
demands something more from a local agency. It asks that agency staff actively
seek opportunity, listen to prodding community voices, and solicit guidance
from governmental partners, including those who offer funding sources or
geospatial tools the agency may lack. It demands a measure of creativity and
collaboration, qualities both promoted when internal and external stakeholders
are actively emboldened to produce novel governance outcomes.295
A permissive and discretionary legal regime gives sublocal institutions the
freedom to forge such an environment. Yet it also, of course, grants agencies a
blank check to adopt far less robust acquisition policies. The lessons drawn
from our empirical study hint at a path forward—at a way to promote
acquisition regimes that closer align an agency’s stated priorities with its
operative outcomes.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Sublocal institutions are consequential sites of policymaking. In an
ecosystem of permissive external authority, sublocal administrators are handed
the keys to the car, delegated the power to make a series of seemingly small
decisions—whether to accept a parcel donation, engage a real estate broker, or
291. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text (describing Cleveland Metroparks’ proactive
regime).
292. See, e.g., Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with Muds to Pin Down the Truth About Special
Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3070 (2007); Frug, supra note 141, at 1781–84.
293. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. Special districts also are traditionally
promoted as apolitical vehicles of technocratic expertise. Richard Briffault, The Local Government
Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1145 (1996). In this role, special
district employees, by virtue of their specialized knowledge and political insulation, may succeed in
accommodating sources of acquisition data outside of the political process, yielding more diverse
acquisition outcomes. The statistical analysis conducted for this Article suggests as much. To a
statistically significant degree, special districts had more complete and mappable acquisition data than
general purpose governments, indicating that these entities possess the resources and skills to leverage
geospatial tools.
294. See supra notes 192, 194, 213–14 and accompanying text.
295. See generally Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City As A Commons, 34 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 281 (2016) (on the role of collaboration in dynamic governance).
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apply for a grant—that aggregate and translate into real impacts on a local
community: they influence where parkland is created and where it is not, where
park resources and priorities are allocated within a jurisdiction and where they
are not. Aggregated even further, these policy choices beget law—a
heterogeneous regime of plans and practices, written and unwritten, that
adjudicate between contrasting acquisition priorities and shepherd properties
through the acquisition process.
Local park agencies should be intentional with their lawmaking power.
Agencies that wish to expand their greenspace footprint—a common goal
expressed by administrators296—should go beyond unwritten institutional
practice to signal this goal in public-facing documents (such as strategic plans)
as well as through internal ones (such as acquisition checklists and operations
manuals). By doing so, an agency can voice its commitment to parkland
acquisition while simultaneously honing a rubric for internal implementation,
actions that this Article has found may help promote local parkland creation.
In addition, agencies that seek to expand greenspace in neighborhoods
traditionally underserved by parks should think introspectively about their
institutional practices. Rather than simply endorsing equity as an aspirational
goal or including equitable considerations on acquisition checklists, local
officials should consider those local models that have successfully broadened
the stakeholders incorporated into the process. Agencies in Miami-Dade and
Atlanta offer useful examples of formal governance practices, whereas agencies
in Cleveland and Cook County provide a blueprint for infusing proactivity into
the acquisition regime. The analysis conducted for this Article found that these
traits—formality and proactivity—are associated with more equitable and
geographically diverse acquisition outcomes.
To be sure, though, our empirical findings are not categorical in degree. As
noted in the legal scholarship, an excess of formality may curtail some of the
values of sublocal governance297—a theory that attracts, at best, some mixed
passing support in our empirical study. The Miami-Dade Park & Recreation
Department, for instance, which has expressed concern that its acquisition
policies are too formal,298 struggled to match the total acquisition output of its
peers.299 Yet Atlanta’s Department of Parks and Recreation, which likewise

296. See supra note 38.
297. See, e.g., supra notes 66 and 71 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
299. In total, the Department has acquired only forty-nine properties since 2010 (or 2.6
properties per 100 miles of jurisdiction), which places it well below the median of 103.0 properties
acquired by all agencies with formal acquisition models studied in this period.
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employs notably formal acquisition practices,300 added more park properties on
a per-capita basis than any other agency studied for this Article.301 Where
exactly to draw the formality line is a question for future research. At
minimum, our conclusions suggest that an element of formality is valuable
when pursuing certain acquisition outcomes, a takeaway that some local
agencies have already drawn from their anecdotal experience.302 At minimum,
then, local officials could formalize practices that presently operate
informally—for example, by requiring notice to an outside stakeholder at a
particular stage in the process—even without rising to the level of Miami-Dade
or Atlanta.
Each of these tweaks could occur internally, in the realm of local or sublocal
administration, and as a result none would fundamentally change the extant
regime of local park acquisition. But without compromising the ultimate
discretion enjoyed by sublocal actors, external sources of authority could still
encourage those reforms, where feasible, by gently establishing a default
framework for parkland acquisition regimes.
In particular, states can play a broader role in setting local acquisition
agendas without eroding local autonomy.303 As a rudimental measure, states
can bolster a requirement that some already impose upon local governments:
the obligation to create comprehensive planning documents.304 Along with
asking that local entities engage in land use planning, states could require them
to consider long-range park and open space goals—and specifically consider
how parkland expansion plans will be implemented and where those expansions
will take place. Such a procedural mandate does not impose onerous tasks upon
local officials or hamper local decision-making; even so, it prompts park
300. See supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text. The Green Team’s express and extensive
involvement in the acquisition process is a structural element not shared by other agencies studied for
this Article.
301. Atlanta has acquired 164 park properties since 2010, or 123.2 properties per 100 miles of
jurisdiction area.
302. See, e.g., Resolution 2018-41, supra note 120 (finding that “broad, inclusive, and
unweighted” acquisition criteria are less effective than specified and weighted ones).
303. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-the Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990) (“New legal doctrines and governmental structures are needed to
encourage state governments to take a state-wide perspective on local problems.”); Darien Shanske,
The (Now Urgent) Case for State-Level Monitoring of Local Government Finances: Protecting
Localities from Trump’s “Potemkin Village of Nothing”, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 773, 773–
74 (2017) (arguing for state oversight to improve local knowledge and decision-making). See also
generally David Schleicher, Constitutional Law for Nimbys: A Review of “Principles of Home Rule
for the 21st Century” by the National League of Cities, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (2020) (discussing the
value of state oversight over local power); Kazis, supra note 187, at 2365 (discussing the value of
shifting some land use authority to state government).
304. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
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agencies to think discretely about their acquisition planning while
simultaneously giving other local stakeholders an opening to express their voice
in the exercise.305 It also serves a basic signaling function. By specifically
incorporating park acquisition into larger planning requirements, states can
remind local residents and officials that there exists, at baseline, a regime of
parkland acquisition, even if permissive and heterogeneous in nature, and that
the structure of this regime might matter to local communities.
Yet states can go a step further, however, by drafting simple default
standards that local agencies can voluntarily adopt.306 These standards could
include template documents—such as acquisition checklists for agency staff,
proposal forms for members of the public, and template operations manuals—
that promote more proactive and formal acquisition practices. A local agency
that has already developed a tailored set of acquisition policies may elect not to
adopt the state standards, choosing instead to rely upon those practices that have
proven effective over time and become embedded into its institutional culture.
But an agency with no written guidelines, high rates of staff turnover, or
reactive acquisition practices—or more broadly, an agency that simply has not
consciously considered its institutional approach to park acquisition—might
find the state-issued standards appealing.307 Adopting them, moreover, could
quickly and painlessly solidify the contours of an acquisition regime that had
been opaque and inconsistent beforehand.308
None of these state-level actions should be politically contentious.309 Nor
should they constrain local park agencies in setting priorities and making
acquisition decisions. Instead, states would forge a model that is both more
modest and more ambitious in scope—one that cultivates a corpus of crossjurisdictional best practices, shedding light upon a legal regime that presently
flies well below the radar and rarely crosses regional lines. Stakeholders could
continue to make parcel-by-parcel acquisition decisions at the lowest and most
informal level of governance. But other levels of government would weigh in,

305. See Clowney, supra note 248, at 51 (advocating for procedural mandates as “comparatively
undemanding” mechanisms that nevertheless can promote public participation, encourage informationgathering by local officials, and ultimately reach better governance outcomes).
306. See, e.g., Shanske, supra note 303, at 774 (advocating for simple default rules at the state
level to guide effective local action).
307. See Bronin, supra note 202, at 2157 (discussing how localities adopt state and national
standards wholesale, in part because such standards pose an easy and appealing model in the face of
local governmental inertia).
308. See Shanske, supra note 303, at 810 (arguing that default rules “dispens[e] and dispers[e]
expert knowledge to local decisionmakers”).
309. See supra notes 30, 33–36 and accompanying text (noting political support for parkland
creation).
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too, lending knowledge and structure to the world of park acquisition—and
perhaps, paving the way for institutional refinement in other fields of sublocal
governance as well.
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APPENDIX
Table 11
Table
Geographic Efficiency

Equity and Access

Properties
Mapped

Properties
Adjacent to Other
Parks

Properties within 0.25
Mile Radius of Other
Parks

City of Anchorage

8

6

7

1

0

County of Maui

20

0

7

17

17

Agency

Properties in Census
Tract Below MSA
Income

Properties in Diverse
Census Tract

City of Bakersfield

24

11

21

8

24

San Diego County

377

237

359

104

248

Los Angeles County

26

1

25

18

22

Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority

745

11

744

160

583

Midpeninsula Regional Open Space District

163

0

155

0

86

City of Honolulu

13

13

13

4

10

City of Detroit

21

7

9

21

21

City of Oklahoma City

10

10

10

6

0

City of San Antonio

255

249

253

182

242

St. Louis County

16

9

16

13

5

City of Kansas City

13

0

12

12

12

Prince Georges County

123

100

123

60

93

Montgomery County (MD)

116

116

116

65

46

Miami Dade

47

39

45

12

18

Palm Beach County

4

4

4

4

0

Lee County

56

0

17

39

0

Volusia County

4

1

4

1

0

Milwaukee County

103

96

101

43

11

City of Phoenix

69

2

67

62

6

Pima County

95

0

7

22

62

King County

424

68

424

218

10

City of Seattle

348

328

348

132

36

City of Minneapolis

23

0

19

17

7

Three Rivers Park District

60

19

36

30

0

Prince William County

7

6

7

3

2

Arlngton County

4

4

4

0

1

City of Raleigh

8

8

8

3

1

City of Portland

22

8

22

22

12

Cook County

99

0

50

78

52

City of Chicago

82

0

77

56

53

City of Colorado Springs

122

2

11

78

0

City of Denver

27

5

17

23

8

Allegheny County

6

1

6

2

0

City of Cincinnati

7

3

7

1

1

Cleveland MetroParks

341

63

81

56

36

City of Columbus

141

20

97

128

4

City of Wichita

12

7

7

8

1

Johnson County

26

24

26

0

0

City of Atlanta

157

7

135

130

103

City of Philadelphia

0

0

0

0

0

Westchester County

0

0

0

0

0

Montgomery County (OH)

0

0

0

0

0

City of Scottsdale

0

0

0

0

0

City of Louisville

16

11

16

5

1

East Bay Regional Park District

223

213

223

56

163

Santa Clara County

36

1

28

14

22

Mecklenburg County

528

205

428

328

207

City of Aurora

93

84

89

65

25

Totals

5120

1999

4281

2307

2251

39%

84%

45%

44%

Percent of Total Mapped
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Table
Table
2 2
"1"

"2"

"3"

"4"

Agencies with no acquisition
planning or procedure
documents

Agencies with generic
acquisition references in
other planning or procedure
documents

Agencies with discrete yet
aspirational acquisition
planning or procedure
documents

Agencies with discrete and
operative acquisition
planning or procedure
documents

p value

Properties Acquired

4.0 [ 0.0;15.0]

25.0 [10.0;43.5]

49.5 [20.0;103.0]

103.5 [27.0;223.0]

0.006

Properties within 0.25 Mile
Radius of Other Parks

0.4 [ 0.0; 2.2]

6.5 [ 3.2;19.2]

7.3 [ 0.6;25.5]

8.8 [ 4.0;33.8]

0.001

Properties in Census Tract
Below MSA Income

0.2 [ 0.0; 1.1]

5.6 [ 1.8;15.1]

6.7 [ 1.0;12.4]

4.4 [ 1.1;39.5]

0.009

Properties in Diverse Census
Tract

0.0 [ 0.0; 1.0]

5.2 [ 0.6;14.1]

1.3 [ 0.5; 4.6]

3.8 [ 0.7;11.2]

0.031

Written Policy Code

All numbers indicate properties acquired per 100 square miles of jursidiction area. Brackets indicate the interquartile range for each association.

Table
Table
33
Geographic Efficiency

Self-Professed Priority

Access Equity

Not Indicated

Indicated

p value

Not Indicated

Indicated

p value

Properties Adjacent to
Other Parks

6.5 [ 1.0;51.5]

8.0 [ 3.0;39.0]

0.678

3.0 [ 1.5; 6.0]

7.5 [ 2.0;68.0]

0.301

Properties within 0.25 Mile
Radius of Other Parks

26.5 [ 7.5;78.0]

26.0 [16.0;135.0]

0.434

16.0 [11.5;16.5]

32.0 [12.0;123.0]

0.125

Properties in Census Tract
Below MSA Income

20.0 [ 8.0;65.0]

23.0 [12.0;78.0]

0.818

13.0 [ 7.0;26.0]

22.5 [ 8.0;78.0]

0.344

Properties in Diverse
Census Tract

22.0 [ 1.0;41.0]

12.0 [ 2.0;86.0]

0.914

1.0 [ 0.5; 3.0]

19.5 [ 2.0;53.0]

0.07

Brackets indicate the interquartile range for each association.

Table 4
Formality

Acquisition Model

Proactivity

Not Indicated

Indicated

p value

Indicated

Not Indicated

p value

Properties Adjacent to Other
Parks

8.5 [ 0.5;21.5]

7.0 [ 0.5;98.0]

0.698

7.5 [ 0.0;116.0]

4.5 [ 1.0;19.0]

0.36

Properties within 0.25 Mile
Radius of Other Parks

19.5 [10.0;62.5]

67.0 [14.0;129.0]

0.128

63.5 [17.0;223.0]

16.0 [ 7.0;89.0]

0.059

Properties in High Poverty
Census Tract

3.0 [ 0.0;13.5]

13.0 [ 5.5;49.5]

0.026

20.5 [12.0;50.0]

5.5 [ 0.0;11.0]

0.004

Properties in Census Tract
Below MSA Income

8.5 [ 0.5;34.5]

56.0 [15.5;91.0]

0.011

56.0 [22.0;130.0]

13.5 [ 2.0;60.0]

0.028

Properties in Diverse Census
Tract

2.5 [ 0.0;18.5]

22.0 [ 8.5;98.0]

0.011

41.0 [10.0;62.0]

4.5 [ 0.0;22.0]

0.02

Brackets indicate the interquartile range for each association.

